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ABSTRACT
The main concern of thin study in consistency in industry 
assistance policy evaluation. A survey of the literature sugaests two 
alternatives for defining consistency but the one adopted in this 
study is the absence of incompatible propositions.
While attention is focussed on consistency in the policy 
evaluation arguments contained in BAE submissions to the IAC and 
related reports over the period 1974-83, the issues raised in the 
study are judged to be of wider applicability. In particular, it is 
argued that the degree of consistency in policy evaluation has 
implications for both equity in the 'rules of the game' governing the 
provision of industry assistance and the level of uncertainty in 
assistance and related producer and consumer markets. Inspection of 
the 1iterature sugqests that any increase in the level of uncertainty 
due to variations in the principles adopted for policy evaluation 
could affect the behaviour of the household and the firm.
Because the BAE has been identified as a major participant in 
rural industry inquiries conducted by the TAC it is important to 
scrutinise the policy evaluation criteria considered and applied in 
its submissions and related reports. To this end a review of the 
economic arguments perceived by the Bureau to be relevant to 
assessments of industry assistance in presented in Part 2 of the 
study. It deals with short-term assistance, longer term assistance 
for rural outputs and assistance for the use of inputs and structural 
adjustment.
From the review of Part 2, a list of economic arguments relevant 
to rural industry assistance is compiled in Part 3. The list covers a 
range of topics including criteria for short term industrv assistance, 
tariff compensation, resource mobility, price instability, market 
imperfections, structural adjustment and welfare assistance.
The Bureau's use ot industry assistance arguments is examined 
from two perspectives. First, an attempt is made to identify those 
occasions where the economic' rircumstances of industries under inquiry
are similar. This information .is then employed for the purpose of 
locatino those submissions where it may have been appropriate to raise 
particular economic arguments, given their consideration in other 
submissions under similar economic circumstances. Second, the 
Bureau's application of industry assistance arguments are discussed 
with a view to identifying any differences in attitude towards their 
validity.
The main results of the analysis are that the Bureau may have 
contributed to the level of uncertainty surrounding the eligibility 
conditions for rural industrv assistance and mav not have always 
employed a consistent policy evaluation framework in its rural 
industry submissions to the IAC and related reports. However, it is 
necessary to exercise caution in the use of these results as they are 
derived from a study which focusses attention on the Bureau's negative 
contribution to consistency. Also, it is not appropriate to use the 
results as a measure of the Bureau's contribution to rural industry 
assistance policy evaluation. Nevertheless, the inconsistencies 
discussed in this study do emphasise the substantial benefits that may 
be associated with careful co-ordination and regular stock-taking of 
the grounds for industry assistance.
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PART 1
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSISTENCY IN POLICY EVALUATION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
In Australia and overseas there has been considerable work on the 
nature and adequacy of the policy making process (see, for example, 
Lindblom, 1968; Loveday, 1982; Emy, 1976 and Edwards III, 1980). 
Particular attention has been focussed in Australia on the development 
of industry assistance policy, especially the public inquiry process 
and the institutions involved in that process. Two recent Australian 
studies are those bv Warhurst (1982) and Edwards (1980). Warhurst 
examines the provision and competition for industry assistance with 
particular reference to the role of the Industries Assistance 
Commission (IAC). Edwards also focusses on the IAC but his concern is 
more with the reasoning behind IAC agricultural policy recommendations 
than with the impact of various interested parties on industry 
assistance decisions.
The purposes of an industry assistance public inquiry process 
have been documented by IAC (1980, p.l). According to the Commission 
it:
'...provides the means by which the views of all interested 
parties (producers, trade unions, importers, retailers, 
consumers etc) can be taken into account and exposed to 
public scrutiny. The public inquiry process provides an 
opportunity for participants to comment on the submissions 
of other interested parties and also places a discipline on 
the Commission in that its analysis and views are subject to 
the same critical public scrutiny'.
Furthermore, Mauldon (1975) discusses four criteria which he believes 
can be used to identify an effective public inquiry process and are 
characteristic features of the TAC. These include independence, 
impartiality, public scrutiny and consistencv. While Mauldon 
discusses these criteria in the context of the activities of the TAC 
it is clear that they are relevant to any advisory body involved with 
the public inquiry process.
2In this study attention is focussed on consistency in policy 
evaluation. The report is based on a case study of the bureau of 
Agricultural Economics (BAF), a research unit located within the 
Commonwea1th Department of Primary Industry (DPTl and the author's 
employer. The main data sources for the study are the published 
submissions by the BAF. to IAC inquiries on rural industry assistance 
and related BAE publications.
The reasons why the author has chosen to focus on consistency in 
policy evaluation in the BAE are outlined in the following chapter of 
Part 1. In summary, however, the methodology and issues considered in 
this studv are judged to be of wider applicability than iust policy 
evaluation in the BAE and of interest to all those involved In policy 
evaluation, reaardless of the sector or industry under study.
1.2 Outline of Study
The study is presented in three Parts. The remainder of Part 1 
(Chapter 2) is concerned with summarising the role of the BAE in the 
public inquiry process and examining the concept of consistency as it 
relates to the subject matter of this report. In addition, some 
hypotheses to be considered further in Part 3 of the study are 
outlined towards the end of Chapter 2.
In Part 2 of the report, policy evaluation criteria used bv the 
BAE in its submissions to TAC inauiries into rural industry assistance 
and related reports are discussed. Part 2 consists of Chapters 3, 4 
and 5. Each chapter is concerned with identifying the major economic 
arguments put forward by the BAE in selected categories of TAC rural 
references. Thus, Chapters 3 and 4 examine respectively RAE 
submissions to TAC inauiries into short-term assistance and longer 
term assistance for outputs of rural industries. Chapter f considers 
those submissions concerned with rural inputs and structural 
adjustment in the farm sector.
Identification and assessment of any inconsistencies contained in 
BAE submissions to 1 AC inquiries and related reports are undertaken in 
Part; 3 of the study. Tn Chapt-er R inconsistencies in the industry 
assistance arguments considered and applied by the Bureau in
3i t s  s u b m i s s i o n s  and r e l a t e d  r e p o r t s  a r e  e v a l u a t e d .  A l s o  i n  C h a p t e r  6 
i s  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  h y p o t h e s e s  
o u t l i n e d  i n  C h a p t e r  2 . F i n a l l y ,  i n  C h a p t e r  , a summary and 
c o n c l u d i n g  r e m a r k s  a r e  p r e s e n t e d .
ACHAPTER ?
CONSISTENCY ANP THF POT,ICY MAKING PROCESS 
?.1 RAF and the Public Inquiry Process
The BAE was established in 1945 as a distinct and independent 
research unit within the Ministrv Post-War Reconstruction. Since 
its establishment the Pureau has been transferred between a number of 
Departments and today is the research unit of the Commonwealth 
DPT .
A detailed statement ot The role and functions of the Bureau is 
presented i r, RAF (19R0a) . For The purposes of this study it is 
appropriate to outline broadlv the two main activities of The Rureau 
and then focus on the strategic importance of the BAF in inquiries 
into assistance to rural industries.
In the Bureau's submission to the Foval Commission on Australian 
Government Administration reference is made to the functions of the 
organisation as perceived by the Minister for Commerce and 
Agriculture, Mr McEwen in 1950.
'The Bureau was established as an independent and 
authoritative body to conduct continuous research into rural 
economic problems, to advise Commonwealth Departments and 
other organisations of financial and economic aspects of 
land use and agricultural policies and to provide primary 
producers with competent and impartial interpretations of 
the economic matters affecting their activities'. (BAE 
1975a, pp 1-2).
These T\;o aspects or The Bureau's activities fie. research, includina 
The identirication and evaluation of poliev options, to provide a 
sound, factual basis fot Government policy making and The provjsion of 
information to assist rural producers with their production and 
marketing decisions) remain The basic functions of the BAF. Tn 
executing these functions, Ministers responsible for the Bureau have 
noted that The BAF is an independent agenev (within DPT) and it should 
publish and disseminate its work as widelv as possible (BAF 19P.0a, pp 
9 - 3 ) .
5In recent years the Bureau's submissions to IAC inquiries into 
rural industry assistance have been a maior component of its policy 
research activities. While not making contributions to all IAC rural- 
references, the Bureau has pursued a policy of orienting its work 
program such that it is in a position to make submissions to those 
inquiries where it has specialised industry data and research skills. 
An indication of the frequency of IAC rural references is given in 
Table 2.1 which lists the annual number of IAC reports concerning 
agriculture.
Table 2.1: Number of IAC Reports Concerning Agriculture
YEAR NUMBER
1974-75 7
1975-76 13
1976-77 6
1977-78 4
1978-79 3
1979-80 2
1980-81 2
1981-82 5
Source*. IAC (1983)
The importance of the BAE in the industry assistance inquiry 
process has been summarised by Warhurst (1982, p. 148). Warhust notes 
that:
'Within the department was the BAE which conducted 
continuous economic research into the rural sector. BAE was 
an agency of the highest status within both the academic and 
rural community. It was perhaps the closest equivalent, in 
research capacity, size and general orientation of its 
staff, to the TAC within the federal public service...BAE 
research was crucial to a successful TAC inquiry into 
primarv industry. Tts evidence was the starting point for 
many investiqations, and its research program was adjusted 
in a number of cases In meet the I AC's needs' .
A better understanding of the industry assistance process and 
where the BAE fits into this process can be obtained from Inspection 
or Figure 2.1. The inquirv process commences with a reference to the 
IAC from the responsible Minister (presently the Minister for Industry 
and Commerce). The reference could originate from a number of sources 
including: (a) a request from an industry Minister (sometimes
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7following frnn private sector internets); (b) a decision by the
government to have an inquiry; and (c) a mandatory reference to the 
T7\C followinq the qrantinq of temporarv assistance by the Temporary 
/assistance Authority. (TAA) '^ ^
After a reference is receive bv the IAC interested parties are 
notified and submissions for a public inquiry are received (under 
oath or affirmation in a public hearinq).
Since 1976 the TAC has published a draft report before further 
hearinqs are held and a final report is prepared for submission to the 
responsible Minister. Between the delivery of the report to the
responsible Minister and the final Government, decision the process is 
not public. Government policy is formulated followinq formal advice 
from the Standinq Committee on Industrv Assistance (SCIA) and informal 
lobbyino by state and federal, departments and interest qroups. SCIA 
may choose to refer back to the IAC for clarification of its
arquments.
In regard to rural references the Australian Agricultural 
Council (AAC) has become increasinaly involved in the industry 
assistance inquiry and policy processes. Following the surge in IAC 
reports on primary industrv in the latter half of 1975 (see Table
2.1), the AAC resolved at its January 1976 meeting to be '...more 
closelv involved with the decision making processes arising from 
references to the IAC of direct concern to aariculture1 (Resolutions 
of the AAC, 95/8, 31 Jan. 1976, p.l?). Subsequently, both the AAC and 
Standing Committee on Agriculture (SCA) considered IAC reports in some 
detail and were given the opportunity to convey their views directly 
to Cabinet through the Minister and indirectly through the 
inter-departmental committee.
Further inspection of Figure 2.1 suggests that the RAE could be 
involved at three stages of the industry assistance, policy making 
process. First, the BAE might advise its Minister (i.e. for the nn) 
to request a reference on some aspect of rural industry assistance. 
Second, the Bureau could prepare evidence for and attend public 
hearinas on primary industry assistance. Third, the RAF could 
participate at SCIA meetings alone with representatives elsewhere in 
the DPT. Of course, the second and third possibilities are closelv 
related as the PAF would usually have a document available, from its 
evidence submitted to public hearinqs, on which to base its SCIA 
representation.
cThrough any or all of the above channels the BAF may have some 
impact upon the ultimate decisions of the Government on matters of 
rural industry assistance. Of course, the Bureau could also use the 
second channel for the purpose of presenting evidence to IAC on how 
assistance to non-rural sectors and industries of the economy affect 
the farm sector and rural enterprises. However, the author is aware 
of only one occasion where the Bureau has exploited this option (see 
BAE 1982a).
From the above discussion it is clear that the Bureau is in a 
position to exert some influence on policy outcomes. Its direct 
impact on the recommendations of IAC reports will vary with respect to 
the relevance and persuasiveness of its arguments as perceived by 
presiding Commissioners. Ultimately, of course, it is the 
government's ministers who will decide upon the fate of the IAC report 
itself.
2.2 What Does Consistent Policy Evaluation Mean?
For any organisation involved in public inquiries, the question 
arises as to whether or not it is appropriate to apply the same set of 
decision criteria over time or across a number of problems at a 
point in time. In the case of industry assistance inquiries this 
question manifests itself in a form whereby those making submissions 
to the inquiry process (such as the BAE) and those preparing reports 
for government (such as the IAC) must decide whether there is a 
framework which can serve as a model applicable to all analyses of 
industry assistance. Of course, many organisations are aware of this 
issue and have recorded their sensitivity to questions of consistency. 
For example, a previous chairman of the IAC (McKinnon 1982, p.l) has 
stated that:
'Thus, in considering assistance to agricultural industries, 
the Commission applies criteria applicable to all 
industries'.
Hence, the IAC certainly displays some concern for applying a single 
framework to all questions of industry assistance which come before it 
and offers the reader a definition of what might be labelled 
consistency in policy evaluation. Of course, it is an empirical
9question as to whether or not the IAC achieves consistency in its 
reports (see Edwards 1980). Moreover, there is the further question 
concerning why consistencv in policy evaluation might be important. 
It is this latter question which is addressed in the following 
sub-section. Before doing so, however, two definitions of
consistency, as they relate to policy evaluation, are discussed.
Formally, consistency in policy evaluation and policy decisions 
has received little attention. A review of the literature identifies 
only two studies which are concerned directly with defining and 
drawing out the implications of an inconsistent policy framework.
The first of these studies is Lindblom's (1965) work on decision 
making through mutual adjustment. Lindblom (1965, p. 193) defines 
consistency amongst policy decisions as the presence of Pareto 
optimality. That is, a set of decisions is consistent if there is no 
way to alter any particular decision(s) in such a way as to benefit at 
least one person and harm no one.
In defining consistency in this manner, Lindblom has a particular 
use of the concept in mind. Lindblom is concerned with the advantages 
and disadvantages of alternate decision making procedures and wishes 
to compare them on the basis of several criteria, amongst which is 
included consistency. In particular, Lindblom's work addresses the 
issue of whether or not there are appealing reasons to believe that 
policy co-ordination across people who lack a common purpose is more 
satisfactory than policy co-ordination via more centralised methods of 
decision making. Lindblom concludes that, contrary to what many 
others suggest, there must be considerable doubt about the validity of 
claims made for central co-ordination as a rational basis for decision 
making.
Kaufmann (1944) provides a second definition of consistencv based 
on the principle of contradiction. A consistent system is defined bv 
Kaufmann (1944, p.62) as one which satisfies the following conditions:
1. 'Simultaneous acceptance of incompatible propositions 
must not be permitted.
2. Simultaneously, with the admission of a proposition into 
a science, the elimination of all propositions 
incompatible with it must be prescribed'.
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Tn this studv attention in focussed on consistency in the sense
defined hv Kaufmann. This choice is not meant to suqqest that pursuit
of consistency as discussed by Lindblom mav not in itself be a worthy
obiective. Father, it is beyond the scope? of this study to attempt to
establish a comprehensive policy evaluation framework that can be
described as satisfying unambigously all the requirements of
(2)Pareto-optimal or related welfare criteria . Instead, emphasis is 
placed here on highlighting and discussing in detail any maior 
contradictions identified in BAE submissions to TAC inquiries and 
related reports. Buch a study may also be relevant to those readers 
interested in consistency, as discussed bv Lindblom, as it- is likely 
to identify alternative policy evaluation principles that might be 
considered in development of a welfare oriented framework for analysis 
of industry assistance problems.
2.3 Implications of Inconsistent Policy Evaluation
The identification of inconsistencies, as defined by Kaufmann, in 
policy evaluation principles and policies themselves is not to be 
regarded as an end in its own right. Such a study is only of use if 
the identification of inconsistencies can be used as a means to pursue 
some other objective(s). In the following sub-sections, two major 
implications of inconsistent policies and policy evaluation principles 
are discussed. The first, 'Inconsistency and Rules of the Game' 
discussed in sub-section 2.3.1, concerns the doctrine that all 
entities in an economy should be governed by the same set of rules 
relating to provision of industry assistance. The second, 
'Inconsistency, Uncertainty and Credibility' examined in sub-section 
2.3.2, suggests that inconsistency in policy evaluation mav have two 
possible effects. First, it could lead to increased uncertainty in 
the rules aoverning the provision of industry assistance and thereby 
affect the levels of output, production and consumption in the 
economy. Second, inconsistent policy evaluation at anv point of the 
public inquiry process might reduce the credibility o^ policy advice 
at subsequent stanes of the public inauirv and industry assistance 
decision processes.
2.3.1 Inconsistency and Rules of the Game
Gonoern about the use of a uniform set of rules for' all 
industries seeking government assistance has emanated from manv 
sources including Prime Minister Whitlam prior to the establishment of 
the TAG. VThitlam criticised the field of industrv assistance 
inherited by his Government as being ’...a complex, eonfusinq and 
inconsistent collection of measures which discriminated between 
individual industries - particularly as between pr.imarv and secondary 
sectors of the economy.. . ' , and promised to rectify the situation 
'...in the interest of fair dealing and open dealinq...' (Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) (85, 27 September 
1973, 1632-33).
As mentioned previous)v, the TAG has arqued that its general
approach is to adopt a consistent approach to questions of assistance. 
Examples of the TAC's efforts to achieve uniformity in the rules 
qoverning industry assistance are provided in its 1975-76 Annual 
Report (TAG 1976) and its second Discussion Paper on Approaches to 
General Reductions in Protection (TAG 1981a). Thus, in the latter 
publication where temporarv assistance criteria are discussed, it is 
stated (IAG, 1981a, p. 17) that:
'To minimise inconsistencies that can arise in the treatment 
of individual industries, both advisory bodies (TAC and TAA) 
have attempted to formalise a set of criteria to be 
considered when deciding whether or not to recommend 
temporarv assistance'.
Similarly, in IAC (1976), it is argued that there was a need to review 
the existing approach to granting temporary assistance and to develop
criteria applicable to all industries. Such a list of criteria is 
discussed further in section 3.1.
In taking this stance the TAG appears to be concerned primarilv 
with an obiective of eauitv in the conditions which determine the 
provision of assistance. This point should not be confused with the 
fact that the efficiencv-oriented framework of the Commission seeks to 
maximise the social return to the use of the commuritv's resources. 
It is the application of the efficiency framework to all producer and 
consumer interests rather than the framework itself which is argued to 
be concerned with the equity obiective.
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The view that the TAC's concern with consistency is related to
equity is supported by Mauldon's (1975, p. 73) argument that:
'Extending a single advisory process to all sectors is of 
profound significance for agricultural policy, since it 
places all industries on an equal footing with regard to 
assistance policy. The Commission's policy guidelines 
contain no special cases. The exporter, the producer of 
foodstuffs, and the self-employed have no more nor less
claim to public support than the provider of services or the 
multinational corporation.'
Mauldon also notes that the application of a single industry 
assistance advisory process has not been unchallenged in the past. He 
refers (1975, pp. 73-4) to the Tariff Board act which '...permitted 
matters of assistance to primary industries to be referred to the 
Board, but as a general rule they are not'. Also '...some 
authoritative proposals have been made for a separate advisory system 
for the rural or mining sectors'.
Crawford (1973) also emphasised aspects of equity in the IAC's
activities. Through its independence, Crawford (1973, p. 3) argues
that the Commission can '...provide disinterested advice in an area of
government activity which will always be subjected to conflicting 
pressures from special interest groups within the community'. Thus, 
the independence of the Commission enables it to apply the same set of 
rules for provision of industry assistance to all industries, 
regardless of their particular characteristics.
2.3.2 Inconsistency, Uncertainty and Credibility
The economic environment surrounding decision makers throughout
the economy has been modified significantly by governments attempting
to promote economic, political and social objectives. For example,
governments have policies relating to employment, price stability,
resource conservation, income distribution and risk reduction to name
a few areas of involvement. Tp the area of rural policy, particular
attention has been placed on measures which benefit farmers via: (a)
rural outputs (eg. discriminatory domestic pricing arranoements for
several rural products, export incentives and inspection schemes and
production bounties); (b) value adding factors (eg. rural adjustment
assistance, agricultural research, concessional credit and income
taxation concessions) and (c) rural inpute (eg. disease control,
(3)fertiliser subsidies and sales tax concessions on inputs)
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The review of industry assistance arrangements requires the IAC 
and other organisations involved in the public inquiry process to 
consider the arguments relevant to the provision of assistance. The 
Industries Assistance Commission Act, 1973 provides guidelines to the 
IAC and other interested parties as to what governments might be 
trying to achieve in the industry assistance arena. These guidelines 
draw attention to governments' desires to improve and promote the well 
being of the community. More specifically, IAC (see McKinnon 1982, p. 
1) regards the guidelines as requiring the development of assistance 
policies which: '...achieve sustained growth through balanced industry 
development, improve the efficiency of resource use, facilitate 
adjustment to change while having due regard to the capacity of the 
economy to sustain change, recognise the interest of consumers and 
ensure consistency between industrv assistance and other policies and 
with national economic policy as a whole.'
By using its efficiency framework for all inquiries into industry 
assistance the IAC addresses an important economic function other than 
the well documented linkage between resource use efficiency and the 
general welfare of the community. This function relates to the removal 
of uncertainty about the rules which govern provision of industry 
assistance. For if the IAC was to employ and apply a range of 
industry assistance criteria in its inquiries there would be 
considerable uncertainty in the economy—about how the IAC would go 
about assessing assistance arrangements. Moreover, a variety of 
policy evaluation criteria could well lead to the emergence of 
substantial inconsistencies in industry assistance policy.
The relevance of the industry assistance guidelines contained in 
the Act extend beyond the IAC to all parties interested in convincing 
the Commission of the weight of their respective arguments. However, 
those making submissions to the TAC are, of course, free to submit 
whatever evidence they regard as relevant to the outcome of an 
industry assistance inquiry. This evidence may not necessarily 
coincide with the guidelines adopted by the IAC. Furthermore, in the 
case of those aqencies which make submissions to a number of rural 
inquiries over a period of time (eg. BAE, National Farmers Federation 
(NFF) and the various state industry interest groups), the evidence 
may contain inconsistencies in the arguments considered and applied to 
a series of industrv assistance problems.
14
While the occurrence of inconsistencies over a period of time 
might affect, in the eyes of the TAC, the credibility of a witness's 
evidence, such a reaction is not pursued any further in this study. 
Rather, it is assumed for the purpose of this analysis that any 
inconsistencies in BAE submissions, either internally or with the 
framework employed by the IAC, are fully reflected in the policy 
criteria and recommendations of the IAC.
If there are inconsistencies present in the submissions of the 
BAE to IAC rural inquiries and these are reflected in the 
recommendations of the IAC and the policy decisions of governments 
then it follows that the BAE could be identified as an agency 
contributing to inconsistencies in industry assistance policy. It can 
be expected that any inconsistencies in policy recommendations of the 
IAC and policy decisions of governments could introduce uncertainty 
into the market for assistance and related producer and consumer 
markets. That is, any contradictions in industry assistance 
recommendations and decisions which arise from the public inquiry and 
policy making processes over time can be expected to add to the 
uncertainty surrounding eligibility criteria for assistance.
In the past, governments have expressed concern about uncertainty 
associated with public inquiries into industry assistance. For 
example, in September 1978, the Minister wrote to the Chairman of the 
IAC advising him that reporting dates would be written into all future 
references so '...that uncertainty should be reduced as much as 
possible to facilitate planning and investment decisions' (IAC, 1979, 
p. 50) . It is of interest to observe the intention of governments to 
minimise uncertainty in a public inquiry process that is often dealinq 
with policy devices to reduce uncertainty elsewhere in the market 
place.
The concern of governments with uncertainty in the 
industry-assistance process is well founded in the theoretical 
economic literature. It is worth noting the key results in this 
literature as uncertainty about the rules governing the provision of 
industry assistance is likely to have real effects on investment, 
consumption and output similar to other sources of uncertainty such as
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variability in international prices. This is because uncertainty in 
the rules determining the provision of industry assistance often 
relates to variables which have been the subject of economic analysis 
under uncertainty such as output and input prices, income, the size of 
a domestic or import quota, the magnitude of an investment concession 
and so on.
The presence of uncertainty in the assistance or any other market 
can be thought of as a lack of knowledge as to what values relevant 
parameters in that market are going to assume in future periods. 
Knight (1933) has distinguished between different forms of imperfect 
knowledge on the basis of whether or not. it is possible to attach 
probabilities to various possible states of the world. Knight refers 
to circumstances where it is possible to assign probabilities to 
alternative states of the world as risk and situations where 
probability assignment is not possible as pure uncertainty.
Following Knight's classification it is unclear as to whether 
imperfect knowledge of the criteria for industry assistance (due to 
changes in the criteria rather than prohibitive costs of acquiring 
information on what the criteria are at any point in time) should be 
classified as a risky or uncertain situation. It may be that some 
individuals feel capable of assigning probabilities to what the rules 
for industry assistance might be in future periods but this is 
unlikely to be true for all those affected by assistance policy 
decisions of governments. Such a description of individuals' 
abilities to assign probabilities is undoubtedly true of many 
situations where there is lack of certainty.
While recognising the usefulness of Knight's work, economists 
have, almost without exception, studied economic behaviour under 
incomplete knowledge on the basis of a world of risk rather than a 
world of uncertainty. Accordingly, the documentation of the effects 
of uncertainty on the household, the firm and the economy presented 
below is one where the term uncertainty is meant to be read as risk as 
defined by Knight.
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Tn reqard to the effects of uncertainty on the behaviour of the 
household There has been a wide ranqe of work on consumption-savinn 
decisions, consumer search models, labour search models and the 
decision to supply labour. The point that uncertainty in the economic 
environment mav have real effects on the household is well illustrated 
by Sandmo's (1970) two period model of the consumption-saving 
decision. Sandmo examines the impact of income uncertainty on the 
consumption-savinq decision and finds that the presence of decreasina 
temporal risk aversion is a sufficient condition for increased 
uncertainty about future income to lower consumption (or 
alternatively, increase saving) in the present period. Mirman (1971) 
reaches a similar conclusion for the case where there is rate of 
return uncertainty.
Concerning the behaviour of the firm it is possible to study the
impact of uncertainty by introducing randomness in output or input 
prices or the production function itself into the conventional 
certainty model. In the case of an uncertain output price, Hey (1979) 
demonstrates that output for the risk-averse firm is less than output 
under certainty. Immediate corollaries are that for the risk-neutral 
firm output is the same under uncertainty as is the case under 
certainty, while for the risk preferring firm, output is greater under 
uncertainty. It is significant to note that in the Australian rural 
sector there is evidence to suggest that while there is a wide range
of risk attitudes amongst farmers, the largest group is the
risk-averters (see Bond and Wonder 1990). Tn the case of the
monopolistic firm Leland (197?) concludes that the effect of
uncertainty in product prices on output is that the risk-averse firm
(4)would produce less than it would under certainty.
There has also been substantial work on the theory o4" factor 
demand under uncertainty. As a generalisation Hey (197 9, p. If 9) 
concludes that '...there do appear to be grounds for sugqcsting that 
the presence of uncertainty (with risk averse firms) leads generally 
to a reduction in factor demand'. More detailed analysis is contained 
in Hartman OB'7*)) in the case of the perfectly competitive firm and 
Holthausen (1976) in the case of the monopolist.
The task of putting toqether the theories of the household and 
the firm under uncertainty to obtain a market model under uncertainty
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has been attempted by numerous authors. The work includes that of 
Diamond (1971) and Fisher (1970) on price adjustment models, Eaton and 
Watts (1977) and Lucas and Prescott (1974) on wage-adjustment models 
and Grandmont (1977) , Debreu (1959) and Rothenberg and Smith (1971) on 
general equilibrium models. In general, the task of developing market 
models under uncertainty has proved to be fraught with difficulty 
because of the interdependence of buyers and sellers behaviour in an 
uncertain world. Nevertheless, it is useful to refer to the work of 
Rothenberg and Smith who consider a small open economy producing two 
goods (whose prices are determined exogenously) from two factors, 
capital and labour. While finding it difficult to obtain general 
results on the effects of uncertainty on resource allocation, 
Rothenberg and Smith do demonstrate the interestinc result that in the 
presence of an uncertain labour supply, national income is lowered 
relative to the case of labour supply certainty.
In regard to empirical studies of the effects of uncertainty on 
the household, the firm and the market, two examples serve to 
illustrate the point that policies which result in the introduction of 
uncertainty may have real effects. While neither of them address the 
impact of uncertainty in the criteria for provision of rural industry 
assistance (a subject yet to be investigated), they are both concerned 
with the real effects of uncertainty introduced by government 
action.
The first study is that conducted by Anderson (1983) on the 
effects of uncertainty in the rules relating to foreign investment. 
Anderson compared the impact on foreign investment of the Guidelines 
administered by the Canadian Foreign Investment Review Agency and the 
Australian Foreign Investment Review Roard. The key result emerq.ing 
from Anderson's study was that the uncertain nature of Canadian 
foreign investment guidelines had depressed foreign investment in 
Canada relative to Australia where the guidelines are characterised by 
less uncertainty.
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The second study of interest is Friedman's (1982) work on the 
effects of the US Federal Reserve monetary policy on interest rate 
volatility and the US capital raising mechanism. Friedman argues that 
the Federal Reserve's strategy of pursuing a tighter monetary policy 
may well have led to a substantial increase in volatility of US 
interest rates and ultimately the impairment of the market mechanism 
for raising long term capital. It is found that in the presence of 
increased interest rate volatility, the non-financial sector relies 
less on long-term debt than would have been the case with a more 
stable interest rate structure. The major consequence of uncertainty 
in the credit market may well be reduced capital formation.
2.4 Hypotheses
Having examined the concept of consistency and discussed the 
implications of inconsistent policy evaluation for the 'rules' 
governing the provision of industry assistance and resource allocation 
it is appropriate to outline the principal hypotheses to be considered 
in Part 3 of this report. Two hypotheses which relate to the 
contribution of the BAE to the industry assistance inquiry and policy 
making processes are:
(1) BAE does not contribute to any inconsistency and 
uncertainty which might characterise the policy 
evaluation principles and policies relating to rural 
industry assistance; and
(2) BAE does not discriminate between rural industries in 
its application of policy evaluation procedures.
It is clear that acceptance or rejection of either of the 
abovementioned hypotheses implies the simultaneous acceptance or 
reiection of the other. This is because in both cases acceptance or 
rejection depends on the detection of inconsistencies in the 
submissions of BAE to rural industrv assistance inquiries and related 
reports. It follows that the procedure which might be implemented in 
the event of finding major inconsistencies in the policy arguments of 
the Bureau is the same regardless of which hypothesis is being 
considered. That procedure is the one outlined bv Kaufmann and
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discussed in subsection 2.1 of this Chapter. Followina Kaufmann, 
acceptance of the hypotheses would require the identification of the 
sources of inconsistency and adoption of non-contradictory arguments. 
The analysis presented in Part 3 of this study goes some way towards 
achieving this objective.
A final point worth noting is that caution must be exercised in 
relation to any claims of inconsistency in the BAE. While this study 
is based on the view that there may be considerable benefits to be 
derived from a consistent policy evaluation framework, it does not 
necessarily follow that any inconsistencies identified in BAE 
submissions to IAC inquiries and related reports are due to errors 
made by BAE. As in the case in other sciences, the methodology 
employed in economics in general and BAE in particular changes to some 
extent due to progress and uncertainty in the discipline itself. 
Consequently, it is likely that at least some percentage of any 
identified inconsistencies in BAE reports would also be found 
elsewhere in the contemporary economic literature.
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PART 2
A REVIEW OF POLICY EVALUATION ARGUMENTS IN BAE
SUBMISSIONS TO THE IAC AND RELATED REPORTS
In Part 2 BAE submissions to rural industry assistance inquiries 
conducted by the IAC are reviewed. Particular emphasis is placed on 
identification of the major economic arguments that were seen by the 
Bureau to be relevant to the provision or reduction of industry 
assistance over the period 1974-83. In addition, some effort is also 
made to compare and contrast these arguments in preparation for the 
more detailed analysis of consistency presented in Part 3.
Because of the fact that some thirty submissions and related 
publications are reviewed in this Part, the discussion of these 
reports is presented in three chapters, each of which deals with a 
particular type or category of assistance. To some extent this 
classification is arbitrary as several economic arguments relevant to 
the industry assistance debate can be found in at least one of the 
following three chapters. Nevertheless, the presentation does serve 
to organise the discussion into a form which readers may find 
convenient. In Chapter 3 submissions to inquiries on short-term 
assistance are examined. Following this, in Chapter 4, is a review of 
BAE submissions to IAC inquiries and related reports concerned with 
longer term assistance for rural outputs. Finally, in Chapter 5, the 
Bureau's submissions on rural inputs and structural adjustment are 
examined. In all three chapters the amount of detail on assistance 
afforded rural activities is necessarily limited. However, readers 
interested in an outline of assistance arranqements governing rural 
industries are referred to Appendix 1.
CHAPTER 3
SHORT-TERM ASSISTANCE
3.1 Background
When the long tern viability of an industry is threatened by a 
temporary downturn in economic conditions the IAC or the TAA may be 
required to inquire and report on the question of short term 
assistance. Because the matter is usually considered urgent, the time 
permitted for a temporary assistance reference is typically short - 45 
to 90 days in the case of references sent to the IAC.
In order to minimise inconsistencies that might arise in the 
treatment of industries seeking short-term assistance, the IAC, in its 
1975-76 Annual Report (IAC 1976, p. 15), outlined several criteria 
which it considered basic to the question of short-term industry 
assistance. These are:
. 'Industries in all sectors should have access to (i)
temporary assistance on the basis of public inquiry and 
common criteria, machinery and procedures. There should 
be no limitation on the form of temporary assistance;
. 'All industries should be required to absorb some (ii)
fluctuations in their competitive position without 
government assistance;
. Industries should have access to temporary assistance (iii)
only if it would be fully consistent with long term 
government decisions on assistance, and if there would 
be irreparable damage without it;
. The higher the existing assistance afforded an (iv)
industry the heavier should be the onus of showing 
that temporary assistance is in the national interest;
. Temporary assistance should be strictly limited in term (v)
and subject to review; and
. There is little case for the provision of temporary (vi)
assistance for individual industries if their 
difficulties are due to economy-wide problems such as 
cost inflation or a qeneral downturn in the economy, 
since such assistance is at the expense of other 
industries including those facing similar 
difficulties'. (1)
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These criteria are referred to in more detail in subsequent sections 
of Chapter 3.
Of the four BAF submissions to.. IAC inquiries on short-term 
assistance examined in this section, only one (beef) was presented to 
the Commission prior to its publication of criteria for temporary 
assistance. The others (sugar, canning fruit and the south-east trawl 
fishery) have all been submitted to the IAC over the past two years.
3.2. Beef
In its submission to the IAC on short-term assistance to the beef 
cattle industry, the BAE (1975b, p. 12) remarks that:
'The beef cattle industry is essentially an efficient employer
of resources and the case for providing assistance on
efficiency grounds would appear to be valid. There would also 
appear to be a valid need for welfare assistance particularly 
for non-viable producers'
Underlying this statement is the Bureau's estimate of the beef
(2)industry's effective rate of protection (calculated on p. 2 to be 
3.9 per cent in 1971-72) and its judgement (on p. 3) that there is a 
'...community objective of ensuring that the income of each adult in 
the community does not fall below a given level'. (NB. my emphasis).
The relatively low effective rate of protection in the beef 
industry is particularly relevant to the view that the industry is 
'...disadvantaged by the protection afforded to other industries' (BAE 
1975b, p. 2). That is, the beef industry may be larger in the absence 
of protection afforded to other rural and non-rural industries of the 
economy. This is, of course, the familiar 'tariff compensation' 
argument which will be considered on a number of occasions in 
subsequent chapters of this report.
The 'tariff compensation' arqument and the Bureau's concern that 
some households in the beef industry are, or are about to become, 
impoverished forms the basis for the Bureau's proposals for assistance 
which mav ensure a viable industrv in the longer term. These
proposals include the provision of carry-on finance, debt
reconstruction and structural adjustment assistance.
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A final point worth noting in relation to the 1975 submission on 
short-term assistance to the beef industry is that the Bureau 
expresses some concern (see p. 5) about a possible movement of 
resources out of an efficient industry in response to a temporary 
economic downturn. The Bureau notes that the risks and associated 
costs of resource movement out of the industry need to be balanced 
against the benefits of maintaining the industry structure and its 
potential production at about the present level in order to take 
advantage of a recovery in the market. Significantly, the Bureau 
argues that 'Judgements of this nature would have to be made by the 
industry and depend importantly on assessment of the market outlook 
for beef'. That is, it is clear that the Bureau, on this occasion, 
does not regard the possession of information on the longer term 
market outlook as sufficient grounds for encouraging the retention of 
resources in the industry during a temporary downturn. Rather, the 
Bureau has provided its assessment of likely market developments and 
left the industry to decide on the appropriate level of resource 
retention for beef production.
Overall, the case for affording the beef industry short-term 
assistance is assessed by the Bureau as resting on the relatively 
efficient nature of beef production and the prospect of significant 
poverty (as measured by income) in farm households. The possibility 
of a movement- of resources ^which may be inconsistent with the 
industry's longer term outlook is raised but it is argued that this 
is primarily a matter of commercial judgement for those engaged in 
beef production.
3.3 Sugar
The approach taken by the Bureau in its submission to the 1982 
IAC reference on domestic pricing and short-term assistance for the 
Australian sugar industry (see BAE 1982b) is oriented around the 
resolution o^ three major issues. First, there is the question of 
whether or not the economic difficulties confronting the sugar 
industry stem from imperfections in the market place which can be 
acted upon by government. Second, the Bureau acknowledges that IAC 
has several basic criteria for provision of short-term industry
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assistance and considers it appropriate to address both their validity 
and the circumstances of the industry with respect to these criteria. 
Third, the Bureau regards it appropriate, in principle, to address the 
applicability of short-term assistance on equity grounds.
Concerning imperfections in the market place, it is clear that 
domestic sugar policies of many importing and exporting countries have 
prevented the transmission of low world prices to producers and 
consumers and thereby lowered world free market prices for sugar. 
However, the Bureau argues (on p. 25) that '...these distortions 
cannot be acted upon effectively in the short-term' and '...the 
appropriate set of prices which should be of principal concern for 
efficient resource allocation in Australia are the observed world 
prices'.
A further argument considered by the Bureau in the context of 
efficiency-related justifications for assistance is the effect of 
export price uncertainty on investment and output in the sugar 
industry. in the presence of risk aversion the Bureau suggests that 
it might be argued that export price variation may lead to less than 
socially desirable levels of investment and output. However, the 
Bureau acknowledges the fact that there are differing schools of 
thought in relation to the validity of the risk-based argument for 
assistance and concludes that, in any event, it would not be 
appropriate to base temporary assistance on the existence of price 
uncertainty which is present in both the short and longer terms.
The position of the sugar industry with respect to several of the 
criteria for temporary assistance outlined by IAC (and discussed 
earlier in section 3.1) is examined in Chapter 4 of the Bureau's 
submission. Of the four criteria addressed by the Bureau (ii, iii, iv 
and vi) it is criterion (iv) which is most closely related to the 
efficiency aspects of temporary assistance. The Bureau's contribution 
on how the sugar industry stands up against the other criteria is 
discussed subsequently.
Criterion (iv) is concerned with avoiding the provision of 
temporary assistance to industries which are already highly protected 
as resource movements out of these industries are generally in the
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long run interests of the community. Furthermore, criterion (iv) also 
suqgests that a movement of resources out of an industry which is 
lightly assisted in response to short term stimuli may not be in the 
national interest. In the case of the sugar industry the concern is 
that resources may flow out of an essentially low cost industry to 
higher cost industries elsewhere in the economy.
On p. 27 the Bureau notes that the'validity of the 'resources 
retention' argument rests on two issues. The first is whether 
resources would move out of the sugar industry if short term 
assistance were not given. The second is, given that resources would 
move out of the sugar industry, whether they would flow to lower or 
higher cost uses compared to their employment in the sugar industry.
The Bureau goes on to question the premises upon which the 
'resource retention' argument is based. In particular, it is 
suggested that it is not clear that a temporary squeeze on industry 
returns will initiate a withdrawal of resources from sugar production. 
Moreover, of those resources which do leave the industry, the Bureau 
suggests that it may be in the community's interest for these to earn 
a higher reward elsewhere in the economy while the sugar market is 
depressed and return to sugar production when more buoyant conditions 
in that market return.
While having serious reservations about the validity of the 
'resources retention' argument, the Bureau, in the interests of a 
consistent approach to temporary assistance policy, does point out 
that sugar production is a relatively low-cost activity. That is, the 
relatively efficient nature of sugar production in Australia lightens 
the onus on the industry to show that temporary assistance is in the 
national interest.
Concerning criterion (ii) the Bureau presents, on p. 29, 
aggregate data on the value, area and prices paid for sugar. However, 
it stresses that '...industry data would need to be made available for 
public scrutiny before it were possible to conclude whether or not 
growers and millers could absorb the most recent fluctuations in their 
competitive position without government assistance.' These data are
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not available in the Bureau as it does not survey the sugar industry. 
For similar reasons the Bureau is unable to comment on the 
applicability of assistance on equity grounds since it has no data on 
incomes, net assets and profitability of growing sugar.
Of the final two criteria considered by the Bureau (iii and vi) , 
it is concluded that one lends support to the case for provision of 
temporary assistance while the other suggests the possibility of 
longer term objectives being jeopardised. More specifically, the 
Bureau notes (on p. 31) that it intends to examine the case of a 
market oriented approach to domestic pricing of sugar and cannot (via 
criterion iii) support the implementation of short-term assistance 
which may be inconsistent with longer term marketing proposals. On 
the other hand, an assessment by the Bureau that the problems 
confronting the sugar industry are, to a significant extent, specific 
to that industry suggests (via criterion vi) that the provision of 
temporary assistance may be appropriate.
The Bureau concludes that while it is difficult to demonstrate an 
efficiency-based case for providing the sugar industry with short-term 
assistance, there may be characteristics of sugar growers and millers 
and the economic problems confronting them which are consistent with 
the IAC criteria for affording temporary assistance. Given the latter 
result, the Bureau regards it as appropriate to evaluate the use of 
two existing policy instruments for the purpose of providing temporary 
assistance. These are assistance under the provisions of the Rural 
Adjustment Scheme (RAS) and raising the domestic price of sugar under 
the 1979 Commonwealth-Queensland Governments Sugar Agreement.
In summary, all of the economic efficiency arguments which might 
be used to iustify the provision of temporary assistance are rejected 
by the Bureau on this occasion. These include the effects of policies 
in overseas countries on world sugar prices, the impact of export 
price uncertainty on investment and output in the sugar industry and 
the withdrawal of resources from sugar production in response to a 
temporarv economic downturn. Also, the case for providing the 
industry with assistance for accomplishing equity objectives is 
rejected. Finally, the industry has some characteristics which comply 
with TAC's basic criteria for temporary assistance. Consequent)'/, 
some short-term assistance options are canvassed.
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3.4. Canning Fruit
Tn January 1982 the BAE (1982c) presented a submission to an IAC 
inquiry into the provision of assistance to the canning fruit 
industry. The terms of reference required IAC to prepare reports on 
longer term and short-term assistance to growers and processors. The 
scope of the BAE submission was limited to assessing the case and 
developing options for assistance in the short and medium terms.
In contrast to its submission on short-term assistance to the
sugar industry the Bureau chose to examine the grounds for assisting 
the canning fruit industry independently of the criteria for temporary 
assistance outlined by the IAC. The Bureau concluded that a case does 
exist to assist the canning fruit industry cope with its problems and 
subsequently evaluated several possible assistance measures.
The broad grounds for government intervention in the rural sector 
are outlined in Chapter 4 of the Bureau’s submission. In particular, 
the Bureau notes (on p.4.1) that:
'On the efficiency side, intervention may be justified where 
there is a difference between private (farmer) and social 
(national) benefits and cost, where public goods need to be 
provided, where the transformation of information is 
inadequate, where risk leads to underutilisation of 
resources and needs to be diffused, where monopolies exist 
in the supply of inputs or in processing industries, or 
where there is a demonstrated need to accelerate the process 
of structural adjustment above what might be achieved 
privately. On the welfare side, intervention may be 
warranted to ensure a satisfactory community living standard 
or to provide equal social and economic opportunity. 
Wherever government intervention is considered appropriate 
it is necessary to ensure that such intervention would 
produce a superior outcome to that, which would prevail in 
the absence of intervention’.
Proceeding from what it regards as the broad grounds for assistance 
the Bureau places particular emphasis (see p. 15) on assistance to 
increase the rate of adjustment in the industry. It is noted that 
'...on both efficiency and welfare grounds, government intervention 
can be justified where there is a demonstrated need to accelerate the 
process of structural adjustment'. The 'demonstrated need' arises from 
a 'number of factors peculiar to orcharding'. These include:
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the sma] 1 size and limited adjustment, options of canninn 
fruit properties;
. the fixed investment nature of orchards;
. the cost of entering alternative enterprises;
the long lead times with alternative enterprises and the 
associated lengthv periods of reduced incomes;
. the existing high levels of indebtedness.
The method, outlined bv the Bureau, for promoting the rate of 
adjustment in the industry is the subsidisation of tree removal. This 
strategy, it is araued (see pp. 4.5-4.6), wj11 '...increase the 
viability of the efficient growers remaining in the industry' and 
reduce the '...hardship for those growers wishing to leave the 
industry.' Thus, the Bureau regards a tree pull scheme as serving the 
twin objectives of 'efficiency' and 'welfare' because such a scheme 
will encourage the industry to contract to a level consistent with its 
projected market outlook and represent a form of financial support to 
those households with basic welfare difficulties. Accordingly, it is 
recommended by the Bureau (see p. 22) that '...the Rural Adjustment 
Scheme be amended to accommodate a tree pull scheme or, if
administratively more manageable, a second fruitgrowing Reconstruction 
Scheme with appropriate improvements be introduced'.
Overall, the Bureau relied principally on the argument that there
is a demonstrated need to accelerate the process of adjustment as a 
basis for recommending the implementation of a tree-pull scheme. A 
number of farm characteristics are selected as the foundations on 
which the argument is built. Tt is significant to note that a measure 
such as subsidised tree, removal is regarded by the Bureau as an 
appropriate means to assist those with welfare difficulties. Tt is 
also important to take note of the fact that on this occasion the 
Bureau has chosen to ignore the basic criteria for short-term 
assistance outlined by TAC.
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3.5 South East Trawl Fishery
Following a request for an inquiry into problems facing south 
eastern Australian trawl fishermen by the Australian Fishing Industry 
Council the IAC was sent a 60 day reference on whether short-term 
assistance should be provided to the industry. The submission from 
BAE (1982d) to the inquiry recommended against the provision of 
specific short term-assistance.
In reaching this recommendation the Bureau makes reference to the
TAC's general approach to the provision of temporary assistance. In 
particular, attention is focussed on criterion (ii) discussed 
previously. The Bureau notes (on p. 25) that, '...the majority of 
boats... appear capable of absorbing some short-term fluctuations in 
income without affecting their long term viability'.
Apart from the Bureau's reference to criterion (ii) there is no 
further direct attention given to the IAC's guidelines for temporary 
assistance. However, there are significant comments made by the 
Bureau about the likely interference with longer term adjustment in 
the fishery that may occur as a result of the provision of short-term 
assistance. It is clear that this point is directly relevant to 
criterion (iii) described earlier in this Chapter.
In summary then, the examination in this Chapter of the Bureau's 
approach to short-term assistance has raised several issues of 
relevance to Part 3 of this study. In 'beef' the Bureau advanced a 
pro-'tariff compensation' argument in support of assistance but showed
only limited concern for the possible withdrawal of resources from 
beef production in the short-term. The 'resource retention' argument 
for temporary assistance was also rejected in 'sugar' as were the 
effects of overseas policies on the local industrv and the risk 
arguments. The unavailability of survey data on the sugar industry 
precluded the Bureau from commenting on any equity case which might 
support temporary assistance to the sugar industrv. However, in the 
case of 'beef' the Bureau noted that households may face significant 
difficulties in terms of depressed income levels. Welfare was also a 
concern of the Bureau in relation to its recommendation for short-term
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support of the canning fruit industry but the means by which- the 
problem would be addressed on this occasion was the subsidisation of 
tree removal. The 'canning fruit' submission was also of interest in 
that it raised the argument that a slower than socially desirable rate 
of industry adjustment may also be a basis for recommending 
assistance. Finally inspection of the Bureau's submissions on 
short-term assistance reveals varying recognition of IAC's criteria 
for temporary assistance. The range of interest in these criteria 
extends from total disregard in the case of 'canning fruit' to 
detailed analysis in the case of 'sugar'.
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CHAPTER 4
LONGER TERN ASSISTANCE FOR RURAL OUTPUTS
4.1 Introduction
Under the classification of BAE submissions to IAC rural industry
assistance inquiries adopted in Part 2, the largest group is that 
concerned with longer term assistance arrangements for rural outputs. 
The industries covered in this study under that category include 
wheat, sugar, dairy, canning fruit, wood and wood products, dried vine 
fruit and citrus.
4.2 V’heat
In its most recent submission to the IAC on assistance 
arrangements in the wheat industry, BAE (1982e) highlights what it 
believes to be a number of inadequacies in the existing regulations 
and proposes several significant changes. Broadly, the Bureau 
recommends that controls operating on the domestic market should be 
relaxed but the current level of assistance afforded to the industry 
should be maintained via alternative methods of assistance ^  . The 
basis for the Bureau's judgement that existing assistance levels 
should be maintained is that the wheat industry is a low cost industry 
which has performed well «despite significant imposts stemming from 
manufacturing industry assistance. A summary of the Bureau's attitude 
towards wheat industry assistance is provided on p.6 of the submission 
where it is argued that:
'As the industry receives little assistance now, 
particularly relative to assistance received elsewhere in 
the community, there is little, if anything, to be gained by 
further reduction in the overall level of assistance. The 
issues are, rather, the effectiveness of current assistance 
arrangements and ways to make the assistance the industry 
receives more effective'.
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According to the Bureau (see p. 12) , ’ . . .deregulating sales on 
the domestic market could potentially have a significant number of 
benefits in terms of the efficient use of resources as well as 
increasing returns to some growers significantly'. The conclusion
that overall assistance levels afforded the industry should not be
.reduced leads the Bureau to identify (see p. 8.2) four options for 
'trading-in' deregulation of the domestic market for alternative means 
of intervention. These are: (1) subsidising output prices; (2) 
subsidising input prices; (3) reducing risk; and (4) subsidising
research.
Of these options the Bureau makes the judgement that providing 
assistance to reduce risk or increase research is preferable to 
subsidising inputs or returns to growers. In particular, the Bureau 
notes (p. 8.3) that '...an input subsidy will tend to distort the 
efficient allocation of resources since the subsidy provides an 
incentive to make greater use of the subsidised input relative to 
other inputs'. Similar efficiency-oriented objections could be 
levelled against output subsidies, particularly in the case of the 
wheat industry where such support is likely to be at the expense of 
sheep, beef and other low cost competing activities. Risk reduction 
could be classified as an output subsidy when expressed as a form of 
underwriting which not only alters the distribution of prices received 
by growers but also changes the mean of that distribution.
Several recommendations follow from the Bureau's argument that 
existing regulations on the domestic market should be 'traded-in' for 
assistance measures which increase research and reduce risk. In 
particular, consideration should be given to further government 
funding of wheat industry research and initiatives to reduce the risks 
confronting wheat growers should be more closely evaluated. Included 
amongst the options relevant to the latter recommendation are removal 
of the constraint on annual variations in the guaranteed minimum 
delivery price (GMP) , expression of the GMP in real terms and the 
undertaking of an investigation to examine whether a feasible all-risk 
crop insurance scheme can be developed.
Some additional evidence submitted by the BAE (1977a) to an IAC 
inquiry on wheat stabilisation throws further light on some of the 
issues raised in the Bureau's 1982 submission. Tn the former 
submission the Bureau examined the likely resource movements into the
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wheat industry that might follow any increase in the level of 
assistance. A central conclusion of the analysis is that the majority 
of resources taken up by an expanding wheat industry would be drawn 
from other low cost agricultural industries so that any improvement in 
national resource use efficiency following the provision of assistance 
to the wheat industry would be small. This conclusion is of direct 
relevance to the Bureau's 1982 wheat industry submission because it 
highlights some potential difficulties with the 'trading-in' 
recommendation. In particular, the 1977 submission raises some doubts 
about the likely magnitude of any national efficiency gains that may 
result from an expansion in the wheat industry due to the replacement 
of assistance on the domestic market with measures which increase 
research and reduce the risks of wheat production. Moreover, the 
results reported in the 1977 submission suggest that if research 
subsidies and measures which reduce the risks of wheat production are 
more efficient than existing measures then the current size of the 
industry might be maintained at a lower level of public support.
The Bureau's 1977 submission also raises several other arguments 
relevant to any debate on industry assistance. They concern both 
efficiency and welfare considerations.
As mentioned, a key result of the submission is that any 
expansion of the wheat industry will, to a large extent, be at the 
expense of other low-cost industries in the rural and non-rural
sectors. The submission also, however, reminds the reader that the 
assessment of national efficiency gains (or losses) following a change 
in an industry's assistance arrangements isn't just a matter of
evaluating the outcome of competition for common resources. It notes 
(p.IIT.10) the possible impact of a wheat industry expansion on the 
exchange rate and the direct consequences for all the traded goods 
sector.
A further aspect of the 1977 submission is its detailed 
discussion of reasons why price stabilisation might be justified. The 
three arguments put forward (at pp. VII. 5-6) are: (a) price 
instability has undesirable resource allocative effects at the farm 
level; (b) short term disruptive price instability does not produce a 
series of production responses consistent with the long term prospects 
in the industry; and (c) price stabilisation is a means of providing
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income support. This final argument is rejected in the submission on 
the grounds that there are superior measures such as adjustment 
assistance and income smoothing technigues which can achieve such 
social objectives. Furthermore, arguments (a) and (b) are qualified 
significantly on pp. VII 6-10. The contribution of price 
stabilisation to improvements in resource-use efficiency is seen to 
depend significantly on the relative importance of price and output 
variability. More importantly, the presence of price instability is 
only a pre-requisite for considering stabilisation policies. 
Implementation of such policies would require identification of net 
benefits which, in the case of the wheat industry, may not be present 
because of the possibility of other low-cost industries competing for 
resources and diminishing returns to expanded wheat production.
4.3 Sugar
The submission by the Bureau (1983a) to IAC's inquiry into long 
term assistance for the Australian sugar industry also proposes a 
"trade-in' of existing assistance for alternative means of 
intervention. On this occasion the Bureau refers to the
inappropriateness of the current domestic pricing arrangements as a 
vehicle for delivering long term assistance. The Bureau argues that 
the major problems with the existing arrangements include: (i) the
relative insignificance of the domestic market as an outlet for 
production; (ii) the unpredictability of the level of assistance 
conferred by the arrangements due to fluctuations in export prices; 
and (iii) the distortionary nature of producer and consumer decisions 
due to incorrect price signals. It is argued by the Bureau that 
consideration should be given to an underwriting scheme as an 
appropriate policy instrument for delivery of assistance.
In Chapter 3 of the submission two main arguments are cited as 
the basis for the provision of assistance to the sugar industry. 
These are:
(i) "capital markets do not efficiently accommodate
risks associated with fluctuations in prices and 
production;
(ii) tariffs and other forms of assistance to other
sectors of the economy penalise rural industries and 
cause resource misai]ocation between sectors.'
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Applying the first argument to the sugar industry, the Bureau (p. 
17) sugqe^s '....that the aggregate of risks associated with 
evaluating producers' viability individually is likely to be higher 
than the risk associated with failure when considering the industry as 
a whole. Consequently... the private cost of coping with price 
instability is likely to exceed the social cost' and '....the sugar 
industry would appear to have a prima facie case for economically 
justifiable government intervention'.
The Bureau's case for underwriting proceeds beyond the risk
argument to a discussion of tariff compensation. If accepted, the 
latter argument is particularly significant as it strengthens 
considerably the economic justification for raising the mean price 
received by growers operating under an underwriting scheme.
In contrast to the Bureau's 1977 wheat submission, there is no 
attempt in the 1983 sugar submission to outline the likely resource 
movements between sugar and other industries following variation in 
the assistance arrangements. Rather, it is noted on p. 18 that the 
efficiency case for long term assistance is dependent on resources 
being able to move into and out of the sugar industry. Hence, 
existing barriers to entry and exit weaken the long-term assistance 
case. It is clear that the 1977 wheat submission goes somewhat 
further in its 'guidelines' for assistance as it emphasises the need 
to be confident that assistance to a low cost industry is not at the 
expense of other low cost industries. That is, the 1977 submission 
not only requires a first or second best case for intervention (eg. 
price instability or tariff compensation), it also demands 
demonstration of the likely net national benefits that will follow the 
provision of assistance.
A final issue raised in the 1983 sugar submission concerns the 
effects of supply control removal on the welfare of those currently 
benefiting from the quota system. On pp. 23-4 the Bureau notes that 
society might wish to protect the interests of producers who may 
experience capital and revenue losses due to deregulation. Such a 
situation could arise as a result of additional sugar sales to lower 
priced export markets, which mav dilute the unit value of the No. 1 
pool from which landlocked producers currently receive their returns.
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Because these producers cannot enjoy the benefits of any industry 
expansion they stand to have their revenue streams and land values 
reduced significantly. While recognising that any decision to protect 
these producers against erosion of the rents conferred on them by 
existing arrangements is a political determination, the Bureau does 
raise some policy options for avoiding any sudden changes in the 
welfare of vulnerable growers. This approach to rural welfare is 
based on the notion that society's social welfare function might be 
conservative (see Corden 1974).
4.4 Dairy
Of all the rural industries, none has attracted more attention, 
so far as questions of industry assistance are concerned, than the 
dairy industrv. Since 1974 the BAE has contributed to the debate on 
dairy industry assistance through at least 10 published reports (BAF. 
1983b and c, 1977b, 1976a, 1975 c, d, e, f and g and 1974a). 
Inspection of the Bureau's reports reveals a host of economic 
arguments relevant to industry assistance analysis.
Perhaps the most common argument in the Bureau's earlier work on 
dairy industry assistance is the view that protection afforded to 
other parts of the economy might justify a departure from unrestricted 
free trade and export parity pricing of dairy products (see BAE 1974a, 
1975d and 1976a) . In particular, the Bureau argued that in view of 
the protection afforded import competing industries, prices received 
by dairy farmers for export sales may not reflect the real marginal 
returns of dairying to the economy. Consequently, it was argued (see 
BAE 1975d) that there may exist a case for raising the marginal 
returns to the industry. A further implication of this argument 
(referred to in subsequent chapters as the existence principle) is 
that it may not be appropriate to withdraw or reduce assistance to the 
dairy industry because resources might flow to other higher cost 
activities which rely to some extent on government intervention for 
their existence.
In more recent times the Bureau (1983c) has altered its attitude 
to the 'tariff-compensation' case for assisting the dairv industry. 
While the Bureau 0 983c, pp 59-60) recognises that a reduction in
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dairy industry assistance may lead theoretically to a flow of 
resources into more highly protected industries, it cites evidence 
which suggests that such an outcome is extremely unlikely. Therefore, 
the 'tariff compensation' argument is no longer considered an obstacle 
to reductions in dairy industry assistance.
Although there have been some changes to the Bureau's stance on 
'tariff compensation' as a basis for assisting the dairy industry, 
other arguments that were adopted in the Bureau's earlier work 
continue to have currency. In the Bureau's examination of 
equalisation arrangements for dairy products (BAE 1974a) concern is 
expressed about the effects of price instability on planning decisions 
at. all points in the production/marketing chain. It is argued (on p. 
54) that'at the farm level export parity pricing may not encourage the 
'best' use of resources because producers may organise their 
enterprises such that resources are devoted to protecting themselves 
against the effects of price instability. In a similar vein, it is 
argued (in BAE 1983c, p. 62) that an individual's capacity to 
withstand the risks involved with a temporary market downturn would be 
less than that of society at large and without intervention, 
underinvestment might occur. This latter argument appears to combine 
the views expressed by the Bureau on price-risk induced 
underinvestment (BAE 1974a) and the movement of resources from an 
industry which is inconsistent with its longer term outlook (see, for 
example, BAE 1977a).
Apart from 'tariff-compensation' and 'price instability' the 
Bureau (1983c) has also considered the economic merits of several
other arguments for assistance to the dairy industry. Political 
interference in the market by foreign governments is rejected as an 
efficiency-based case for assistance as is the regional concentration 
of farmers likely to be affected by reductions in protection. 
Furthermore, the international comparability of consumer prices is 
regarded as an appropriate factor to consider but it is pointed out 
that the comparison should be with efficient producing countries where 
prices are lower. Finally, the view that dairy industry assistance 
should be retained because of its low per capita cost to consumers and 
large gains to individual farmers is also rejected. This is because 
the Pureau sees the burden of supporting the dairying industry as 
being larger for low income households with larqe fdimilies.
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Having rejected this ]atter group of arguments as representing 
economic grounds for assistance and moved away from its earlier 1974 
argument that assistance to the dairy industry might be warranted on 
'tariff compensation' grounds, the Bureau is left, in its 1983 
submission (BAE 1983c) , with the resource allocation effects of price 
instability as the only economic ground for intervention. This 
argument is elaborated upon in some detail on pp. 64-5 of the 
submission:
'The chance of such instability might provide an 
economic/welfare base case for intervention. It would not, 
however, of itself justify assistance of more than a 
potholing nature...'
However, there is some doubt expressed by the Bureau on p. 65 about 
the strength of the argument:
'There is no reason to believe that resources cannot, given 
time, re-enter dairying where to do so would be profitable. 
Against this background, high levels of assistance could 
well prove very expensive insurance.'
Nevertheless, the Bureau goes on to recommend that ultimately, the 
underwriting of market returns should be the major form of assistance 
to the dairy industry. It is significant to note that support for an 
underwriting scheme cannot rest on the price instability argument 
alone. This point has been acknowledged informally in other BAE 
submissions (such as BAE 1983a) where 'price instability' has been 
coupled with 'tariff compensation' to form a basis for recommending 
underwriting schemes which may not preserve the mean export return. 
It would seem, therefore, that BAF's support of an underwriting scheme 
for the dairy industry would rest on the economic effects of price 
instability and the fear of resources leaving their current employment 
in response to short-term stimuli which are inconsistent with the long 
term industry outlook. That is, the 'resources retention' argument 
appears to have displaced the 'tariff compensation' argument as a 
basis of support for underwriting on grounds of economic efficienov. 
This result is of particular interest given the rejection of the 
'resources retention' argument .in other BAE submissions.
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A final point worth noting concerns the Bureau's support, on this 
occasion, for the use of underwriting as an instrument for addressing 
welfare problems of dairy industry households. Underwriting affords 
assistance in direct proportion to the size of a farm's output. The 
regressive nature of price-support as an instrument dealing with 
welfare problems of farm households has led the Bureau on other 
occasions (eg. BAE 1977a) to recommend the use of measures which are 
directly related to income (eg. income smoothing techniques) as a 
basis of welfare assistance.
4.5 Canning Fru.it
Tn its submission to the IAC inquiry into assistance to the 
canning fruit industry, BAE (1982f) identifies two essential 
attributes of an efficient marketing system. First, such a system 
should reflect back to producers the marginal returns or the returns 
from the lowest priced outlet. Second, it should not obstruct 
movement of resources into or out of the industry. The Bureau is 
careful to point out, however, that modifications to the existing 
assistance arrangements must be made in full recognition of the 
possibility that reductions in the level of protection may lead to 
resource movements to other higher cost industries. Consequently, 
’...there is an economic argument that the level of assistance to the 
canning fruits industry should be equivalent to that given to 
industries which compete for the same resources...' (see p. 5.19). 
Just what that level of assistance might be, however, is not clarified 
by the Bureau. Several industries (citrus, sultanas and dairy) are 
cited (on p. 5.19) as competing for the same resources employed by the 
canning fruit industry but their effective rates of assistance vary 
considerably. For example, the TAC (1983) reported effective rates of 
assistance in the citrus, dried vine fruits and dairy industries as 
being 85, -5 and 31 per cent respectively in 1980-81.
Tn addition to the economic efficiency aspects considered by the 
BAE in its canning fruits submission the question of welfare-related 
assistance is discussed. The specific instrument suggested to deal 
with problems of hardship that those leaving the industry might
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experience is a government sponsored tree-pull scheme. The choice of 
this measure is of interest in that it would most likely confer 
benefits on producers in direct proportion to the number of trees 
pulled and result in a pattern of welfare benefits which bears little 
relationship to the wealth-income status of individuals. In addition, 
such a scheme might cause the removal of trees whose fruit could be 
sold in non-canning outlets. The suggestion in this submission of a 
tree-pull scheme to deal with welfare problems contrasts with the 
recommendations concerning welfare measures in other Bureau 
submissions and related reports (eg. see the Bureau's 1977 wheat and 
1983 dairy submissions (BAE 1977a, 1983c) where direct income-related 
instruments and underwriting market returns are discussed repsectively 
as welfare measures) .
4.6 Wood and Wood Products
As in its submission to the IAC inquiry into the canning fruit 
industry, the BAE, in its submission to the IAC's inquiry into wood 
and articles of wood (BAE 1980b) , addresses the questions of whether 
and if so, to what extent, existing assistance should be reduced. In 
the latter submission the Bureau expresses concern about the effects 
on investment in plywood production of continued assistance to the 
industry. It is argued, amongst other things, (p. 88) that the
greater protection afforded the plywood manufacturing industry 
relative to other wood processing industries will result in distorted 
investment decisions. The Bureau recommends (p. 26) the phased
reduction of nominal tariff levels to the average nominal level for 
other wood product industries determined by the IAC's inquiry.
There are three noteworthy points about the nature of the 
Bureau's recommendation. First, it suggests that the industries 
competing for resources used by the plywood industry are limited to 
other wood product industries. There does not appear to be the 
concern (perhaps justifiably) expressed in the Bureau's 1977 wheat 
submission that the linkages between industries are very complex and 
may reflect macroeconomic variables as well as common inputs into 
production. Second, the recommendation is to reduce assistance to the 
plywood industry to an average of the levels enjoyed by other wood
product industries. This part of the recommendation is meant to deal 
directly with any difficulties which might be encountered in relation 
to widely disparate levels or rates of assistance of industries 
identified as competing for the resources used by the plywood
industry. It contrasts, however, with the canning fruit 
recommendation (see BAE 1982f) which advocates a reduction in that 
industry's assistance to the level afforded to competing industries. 
Third, it is significant that the Bureau recommends a variation in the 
plywood industry's nominal rather than effective level of assistance. 
The preference to amend nominal rather than effective levels or rates 
of assistance presumably reflects the Bureau's judgement that the 
consumption distortions of the tariff are more significant than the 
production distortions.
A reduction in the plywood industry's tariff protection is,
according to the Bureau, not the only amendment that should be made to
the industry's assistance arrangements. The Bureau sees merit (p. 22)
in providing a more certain production and investment environment to
insulate the industry against the effects of sharp and unexpected
falls in world prices and proposes the introduction of a variable
(2)import levy to achieve this objective
While it does not offer explicitly an economic efficiency
argument to support the use of a variable import levy, it seems that 
the Bureau's proposal for 'a more certain environment' is based on 
'the adverse effects of price instability argument' canvassed in
several other BAE submissions (see, for example, BAE 1977a, 1983a).
Furthermore, the Bureau's recommendation that tariff protection be 
reduced at the same time as a variable import levy is introduced 
represents a 'trade-in' of assistance to the plywood industry. In 
this instance, however, the effects of the 'trade-in' on resource 
allocation in other wood product manufacturing enterprises and 
industries elsewhere in the economy are not evaluated.
4.7 Citrus
The author is aware of two submissions made by the BAE to I AC 
inquiries into assistance to the citrus industry. The first (BAE 1981) 
is concerned with support to the orange and tangerine juices industry 
and considers, amongst other things, the benchmark level of assistance 
that might form the basis of adjustment to the industry's protection.
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The second (BAE 1977c) is also concerned with amendments to industry 
assistance but focusses upon adjustment and welfare support to the 
citrus industry. The main recommendation of the Bureau's submission 
to IAC's inquiry into assistance to the orange and tangerine juices 
industry (BAE 1981) is that protection should be phased down over an 
extended period. It is argued (p.16) that adoption of this policy 
will '...enable and encourage the industry to achieve productivity 
gains and longer term cost reductions or to adjust by diversion of 
some resources into other enterprises or off-farm pursuits'.
There are a number of economic disadvantages, according to the 
Bureau, of the existing high level and forms of assistance. In 
particular, they:
. insulate the industry from trends in world prices;
. impose a significant cost on consumers and constrain consumption
of oranges and orange juice;
. contribute to upward pressure on land prices;
. attract resources out of low cost industries and do not
efficiently support incomes of small farmers.
It is primarily these circumstances which leads the Bureau to 
conclude (p.15) that there does not appear to be any economic case for 
continuing with existing levels of assistance, though it is 
acknowledged that some welfare or adjustment support may be 
appropriate. The Bureau recommends that the level of industry support 
be reduced to a level commensurate with that received by other 
horticultural industries.
In contrast to many other rural activities, the orange industry 
is relatively highly assisted. For 1980-81 the industry's effective 
rate of assistance was estimated by the IAC (1983) to be in excess of 
100 per cent, at least 14 times the average for the rural sector and 4 
times the average for the' manufacturing sector. Because the orange 
industry must be amongst the 'tallest poppies' in terms of its 
effective rate of assistance, the Bureau could recommend a reduction 
in industry support virtually without fear of resources flowing to 
higher cost uses. Nevertheless, the decision to recommend a reduction
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in an industry's assistance remains complex to the extent that the 
Bureau still had to assess the magnitude of the appropriate reduction. 
As mentioned, the benchmark chosen was ’...a level commensurate with 
that received by other horticultural industries', a 'level' which was 
presumably selected because of the likelihood that it is other 
horticultural industries which compete for resources employed by the 
citrus industry. The nature of the Bureau's recommendation is very 
similar to its conclusion in its canning fruit submission (BAE 1982f) 
where it was argued that assistance be reduced to a level afforded 
competing industries. However, just what these levels are, when it is 
known that competing industries have widely different rates of
(3)assistance, is unclear. ~ . The alternative solution, adopted in the 
Bureau's submission on wood and articles of wood (BAE 1980b) , is to 
use an average of competing industries rates of assistance as the 
benchmark, a strategy where assistance disparities remain but are at 
least diminished.
In its earlier 1977 submission to IAC, the Bureau (1977c, p.12) 
also found that, on the basis of 1974-75 data, citrus production is a 
relatively high cost industry compared to many other rural and
(4)manufacturing industries . However, on this occasion the Bureau 
did not analyse or recommend a reduction in the industry's assistance. 
Rather, it noted (p.18), that '...it is apparent that continuing 
adjustment in the industry will lead to improvements in efficiency and 
profitability. Assistance aimed at encouraging and facilitating such 
adjustment would therefore seem to be justified on efficiency 
grounds'. The Bureau's argument that adjustment assistance is 
iustified on efficiency grounds appears to be based on the view that 
there are impediments to adjustment which, if removed or modified, 
would improve the economic situation of the industry. Particular 
emphasis is placed on the nature of the citrus enterprise (relative 
fixity of assets, large initial investment, long investment/production 
lags) and restricted opportunities for off-farm employment.
A further conclusion reached by the Bureau is that the industry 
is likely to be subject to a continuing welfare problem, although the 
magnitude of this problem may be less acute when income and net worth
(rather than income alone) are included in the welfare assessment.
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Overall, t bo Pureau concluded (p.?0) that '...the obiectives of 
continuenq to encouraqe adjustment while providinq welfare assistance 
of a basically interim nature is consistent with the aims and 
obiectives of the existina Pural Adjustment Scheme'.
4.R Dried Vine Fruit
In IS75 the Bureau (RAF 19'?5hl presented a preliminary submission 
to an TAC inquiry into assistance to the dried vine fruits industry. 
Because the economic performance of the industry in the two years 
immediat.elv precedinq the 'submission was reqarded by the Pureau as 
'satisfactorv', attention was focussed on resource use efficiencv 
rather fhan welfare related issues. Tn particular, the Bureau 
considered the economic case for price stabilisation and adiustment 
assistance.
Tn reqard to price stabilisation the Bureau (lQ75h, p.9) arqued
that it mav be desirable, on efficiency qrounds, to 'dampen' short 
periods of hiqh prices in order to reduce investment (and subsequent 
economic losses! based on a limited assessment of the market outlook. 
This arqument was seen to be particularly relevant to industries such 
as dried vine fruits production, where world output has a siqnificant. 
impact on price received, and where there is a lono qestation period 
between the makinq of investment decisions and the production of 
maximum output. This arqument is similar to the 'resource retention* 
arqument put forward in the Bureau's 1R77 submission to the TAC 
inquirv on wheat price stabilisation.
A further feature of the Bureau's analvsis of price stabilisation 
for the dried vine fruits industry, also present in its submission to 
the TA.c on wheat price stabilisation, is that the presence of output 
price risk is not a sufficient condition for covernment intervention. 
The Bureau notes (lB7Sh, p.°^ that price stabilisation miqhf cause 
substantial social losses if it causes investment decisions to be 
based on biased price oxpectations,. Therefore, the economic case for 
price stabilisation becomes an empirical problem, dependent upon the 
nature of trends and fluctuations in prices and the particular 
stabilisation mechanism employed, rather than a problem which can be 
resolved on principle alone.
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Concerning the structural adjustment process, the Bureau finds 
the market system, at least in some respects, to be inadequate. In 
particular, the Bureau notes (p.13) that growers with access to 
adequate supp] ies of capital may wish to expand the scale of their 
operations but an important impediment to this process is '..the time 
scale within which blocks come up for sale'. The Bureau's conclusion 
that '...market forces cannot be relied upon to ensure eventual 
consolidation of blocks sequentially acquired' leads them to identify 
the Fruitgrowing Reconstruction and Rural Reconstruction Scheme as 
possible means of solving such problems. In section 5.2 of the 
following chapter, where the Bureau's 1983 submission to the IAC's 
inquiry on Longer Term Rural Adjustment is discussed, attention is 
again focussed on market impediments to farm adjustment.
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CHAPTER 5
RURAL INPUTS AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
5.1 Fertilisers
Of the inputs into rural production that have been the subject of 
TAC inquiries, fertilisers have probably received the most attention. 
Since 1973 the BAE has made three submissions to IAC inquiries on 
fertiliser subsidies, the first two (BAE 1975i, 1976b) on phosphatic 
fertilisers and the third (Easter et al. 1982) on nitrogenous and 
phosphatic fertilisers.
In its preliminary report on phosphatic fertilisers, BAE (1975i) 
addressed the question of whether or not the superphosphate subsidy 
should be reinstated. The 'tariff compensation' argument was 
identified as providing a potential basis for assisting the farm 
sector but was rejected because of the practical difficulties 
associated with its implementation. In particular, the Bureau (1975i, 
p.10) argued that for '...it (the tariff compensation argument) to be 
acceptable in practical terms, it would appear to be necessary for 
specific need to be established and accordingly for each rural 
industry or group of producers to be assessed on an individual basis'.
Analysis of the relative efficiency of resource allocation 
undertaken by the Bureau (1975i, p.ll) indicated that more efficient 
employment of resources on farms using superphosphate might be 
achieved through an expansion in the improved pasture input and 
therefore, the increased use of superphosphate. However, it did not 
appear that potential efficiency gains were being prevented because of 
market imperfections or external factors relating to superphosphate 
use. On the basis of the evidence examined, the Bureau could not 
support the provision of assistance for the use of superphosphate.
Following the IAC's recommendation for reintroduction of a 
superphosphate subsidy the Government announced a bounty of $11.81 per 
tonne for the period February 1976 to June 1977. However, the IAC was
also asked to report by July 1976 on the need for longer-term 
assistance regarding the use of phosphatic fertiliser. It was this 
latter inquiry to which the Bureau's 1976 report was directed.
As with its 1975 superphosphate report, the 'tariff compensation' 
debate figured prominently in the Bureau's 1976 report. Although 
there had been some discussion of tariff compensation immediately 
prior to publication of the Bureau's report (see Harris 1975, Sampson 
1975, Norman 1975 and Lloyd, 1975) the main conclusions reached 
earlier by the Bureau, while refined, remained largely unchanged in 
its later report. Once again, the Bureau (1976b, p.15) noted that it 
is necessary for assistance provided on tariff compensation grounds to 
be selective, because the extent of loss or gain from the tariff will 
vary within and between sectors according to relative efficiency and 
the degree of resource substitutability. It was argued that a 
superphosphate bounty would not be sufficiently selective to achieve 
the resource allocation objectives of tariff compensation. Also, the 
Bureau once again examined the argument that market imperfections 
might impede farmers from effecting resource use efficiency 
improvements but it was concluded that, if present, such constraints 
should be addressed directly rather than through an input subsidy.
Another issue addressed in the Bureau's 1976 report is the price 
elasticity of demand for superphosphate and its relationship with the 
resource use efficiency aspects of a superphosphate subsidy. It is 
noted that where the demand elasticity is low the subsidy would accrue 
to farmers as income and there will be little increased use of 
superphosphate relative to the situation where there is no subsidy. 
It is clear that this result is of direct relevance to any tariff 
compensation argument for maintaining the superphosphate subsidy as 
that argument is itself based on the notion that assistance to the 
rural sector will restore output to that level which would have 
prevailed had there been no tariff protection afforded to the 
manufacturing sector. It is equally clear (though not considered by 
the Bureau in its 1976 report) that a low demand elasticity for 
superphosphate is of little support to proponents of the 'existence 
principle' who might wish to argue in this case that the subsidy 
should not be discontinued because of the danger of resources flowing 
subsequently from low to higher cost activities.
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The Bureau's 1976 submission also raises several welfare related 
issues in relation to continuation of the superphosphate subsidy. 
First, it is argued that imposition of a maximum tonnage to which the 
subsidy would be applicable could be appropriate if the prime purpose 
of the subsidy is to raise rural welfare. This is because the main 
beneficiaries of an input subsidy are larger producers who tend to 
earn high farm incomes. Second, it is argued that an input subsidy 
might be considered as a means of maintaining income relativities 
across the economy in an environment where farm incomes are under the 
pressures of a cost-price squeeze. However, the use of a 
superphosphate subsidy to raise farm incomes is rejected because of 
its inferiority to alternative measures which act directly on income 
and its small impact on incomes of the majority of farmers. Finally, 
the Bureau considers the usefulness of a superphosphate subsidy for 
promoting farm adjustment but concludes that such a measure would most 
likely inhibit rather than encourage movement of low income producers 
out of their respective industries. The linking of adjustment to 
welfare goals in the Bureau's 1976 report is similar, in principle, to 
the provisions of the housing expenditure loan plan outlined in the 
Bureau's 1983 submission to the IAC inquiry on Longer-Term Rural 
Adjustment, (see section 5.2) where it is proposed that loans to 
farmers facing welfare difficulties be converted to grants if they 
leave their employment within 12 months of their most recent payment.
In its most recent submission to an IAC inquiry on fertiliser 
subsidies, the BAE (see Easter et al. 1982) addressed the question of 
whether assistance should continue to be provided for the consumption 
of phosphatic and nitrogenous fertilisers. Yet again the Bureau 
considered the merits of the tariff compensation argument for 
justifying fertiliser subsidies but concluded that there is 
considerable doubt as to whether such assistance would lead to an 
improvement in national welfare However, unlike the Bureau's 
1976 report, the 1982 report also raises the 'existence principle' as 
a basis for not removing or reducing existing assistance, including 
fertiliser subsidies, afforded to the rural sector. In particular, it 
is argued (see Easter et al. 1982, p.49 and p.59) that:
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'...partial or total removal of assistance to rural
industries together v;ith the retention of high levels of 
assistance to high-cost industries mav create a more 
inefficient allocation of resources than maintaining 
assistance to the rural sector in the same
circumstances....This conclusion stems from the argument 
that removal of assistance to the rural sector mav result in 
a flow of resources to higher cost industries elsewhere in 
the economy'.
On pp. 42-3 of the Bureau's 1982 submission and in its earlier 1Q76
submission it is argued that the price elasticity of demand for
fertilisers in the longer term is low and inelastic, thereby casting
doubt on the validitv of the conclusion that removal of the subsidy is
not iustified on efficiency grounds. That is, a reduction or removal
of the fertil iser subsidy may not be expected to result in a
significant reduction in. fertiliser use or output on farms where
(2)fertiliser is an input into production.
Because of its concern that withdrawal of fertiliser bounties may 
disadvantage the rural sector relative to other sectors in the economy 
the Bureau suggests that public expenditure, saved through removal of 
the fertiliser subsidies might be reinvested elsewhere in the form of 
'...more efficacious rural assistance measures'. In particular, the 
Bureau argues (p.60) that assistance to replace fertiliser subsidies 
should be designed to be cost-effective in attracting resources to the 
rural sector. Hence, the Bureau has advocated a 'trading-in' 
arrangement where fertiliser subsidies, which are regarded as 
ineffective in stimulating rural output, are swapped for assistance 
measures which better serve the goals of tariff compensation.
Such a strategy appears odd given the Bureau's stance in all of 
its fertiliser submissions on tariff compensation. In particular, the 
Bureau does not express any concern in its 1982 submission about the 
practical difficulties associated with ensuring that new or 
replacement assistance measures do not attract resources from lower 
to higher cost industries. Bather, a set of criteria for selecting 
second-best measures which are cost effective on tariff compensation 
grounds is outlined and it is recommended that unless an instrument 
which satisfies these criteria and improves national income can be 
found then the fertiliser subsidies should remain in place.
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5.? Structural Adjustment
In a recent submission to an IAC inquiry into I.onger Term Rural 
Adjustment, the BAE (1983d) addresses the case for rural adjustment 
assistance. Particular attention is focussed on defining the nature 
of the adjustment problem and assessing the economic efficiency and 
welfare aspects of adjustment assistance.
The Bureau's perspective on the nature of an adjustment problem 
is put forward on pp. 4-5 of its submission where it is noted that:
'Care is required that a perception of an adjustment 
'problem' is well founded in relation to national objectives 
and that an adjustment problem does in fact exist...A 
perceived or sub-optimal rate of adjustment may be due to 
inevitable time lags accompanying the dynamic process of 
adjustment, or the uniqueness of benefits to producers from 
resources under their control which provide them with 
effective incomes substantially in excess of those reported 
through farm surveys...A genuine adjustment 'problem' does 
exist when impediments or imperfections in the market system 
can be identified which effectively prevent resources from 
moving to their best use...Where governments perceive the 
rate of adjustment to be unacceptably low or excessively 
high, then an adjustment 'problem' will be identified...Such 
a 'problem' is only a true problem if obstacles...can be 
identified, or society judges the outcome as undesirable'.
Concerning the efficiency-based case for adjustment assistance, 
the Bureau (pp 3.7-8) identifies four relevant arguments. First, the 
presence of assistance to high cost industries in the rural and 
non-rural sectors suggests that a reduction in assistance received by 
low cost rural industries may result in an overall efficiency loss due 
to the likely movement of resources from lower to higher cost 
activities. Second, the identification of market imperfections may 
warrant the provision of assistance in circumstances whereby a 
first-best solution (ie. removal of the imperfection) is not possible. 
The major imperfections suggested by the Bureau are related to the 
rural credit market where it is argued that farmers credit 
requirements remain unsatisfied due to the regulatory nature of the 
financial system. Third, the 'resources-retention' argument discussed 
in several other BAE submissions is also suggested to be relevant in 
the context of adjustment assistance. It is argued (see p. 3.13) that
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both bankers and fanners may take an unnecessarily pessimistic view of 
the prospects for farm businesses, thereby causing inappropriate 
resource movements from the viewpoint of national economic efficiency. 
Finally, the Bureau cites (p. 3.14) the risky and long-term nature of
agricultural investment as requiring flexibility in credit facilities. 
It is suggested that institutional rigidities in the banking system 
may deny farmers of access to their credit needs.
The broad applicability of these arguments to most Australian
farmers raises, in the Bureau's opinion, some doubts about their use
for justification of intervention to promote adjustment at the margin
(3)such as that encouraged by RAS . Indeed, the Bureau suggests (p. 
3.16) that '...the efficiency case applies equally to all farmers and 
not specifically to a marginally 'viable' set of producers facing 
particular adjustment problems'. Moreover, the Bureau notes that the 
benefits of adjustment assistance will be maximised by conferring 
assistance on those farmers who are most capable of generating the 
largest efficiency pay-off. The latter group is likely to be farmers 
in the upper income group rather than those currently assisted for 
adjustment purposes.
In regard to the welfare case for rural adjustment assistance the 
Bureau refers (p. 3.18) to the 'safety net' concept of providing a
minimum level of farm income. While the Bureau acknowledges RAS to be 
a welfare scheme designed to assist groups of farmers to improve their 
incomes, it also suggests that a rural adjustment scheme may be an 
inappropriate institution within which to house a welfare policy. 
Rather, it may be more appropriate to look towards broad economy-wide 
measures to achieve hardship and intra/intersectoral equity 
objectives.
Having rejected the efficiency case and criticized the welfare 
case for marginal adjustment assistance, the Bureau concludes that the 
decision to continue or terminate RAS must be regarded as a political 
judgement. In the event that adjustment assistance is regarded as 
appropriate, the Bureau suggests the use of a set of criteria to 
assess the adequacy of existing and alternative adjustment policy 
instruments.
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The criteria against which RAS provisions are assessed include:
(1) Resource flows into agriculture;
(2) Resource flows out of agriculture;
(3) Resource flows within agriculture;
(4) Efficiency of national resource use;
(5) Economic hardship or poverty;
(6) Inter and intrasectoral equity; and
(7) Administration and the cost-effectiveness of the
intervention.
The Bureau's evaluation of RAS against the abovementioned 
criteria leads to the conclusion that most RAS funds are used to 
promote intrasectoral adjustment. Only 5.5 per cent of RAS funds are 
allocated for farm build up, household support and rehabilitation 
purposes, thereby suggesting that further attention may need to be 
given to funding of resource outflows from agriculture. Also, the 
Bureau concludes that the welfare provisions of RAS appear, at 
present, to be less than effective.
The remedies for the inadequacies of RAS suggested by the Bureau 
are twofold. First, redress of any imbalance in the adjustment 
provisions of RAS could be achieved by a modification of the 
proportion of funds allocated to specific measures, or by changes in 
the provisions themselves. However, the Bureau warns (see p. 14) that 
because objective measurement of the correct inflow or outflow of 
resources in agriculture is not possible, any decisions concerning the 
nature and extent of an imbalance must remain judgemental. 
Nevertheless, the Bureau suggests that a review mechanism may go some 
way towards ensuring that RAS funds are employed effectively. Second, 
the Bureau recommends that the existing household support provision of 
RAS be terminated and replaced by a household expenditure loan plan 
(HELP) which would raise farm income to the level of the unemployment 
benefit. The latter scheme is a carry-on loan provision for household 
expenditure purposes whereby farmers repay a loan if they choose to 
remain in their present employment. However, should farmers choose to 
leave farming within a year of receiving their latest payment then 
HELP payments could be converted to a grant. It is clear, therefore, 
that HELP is a welfare provision whose benefits are tied to adjustment 
choices of the recipient.
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The analytical framework and conclusions presented by the Bureau 
in this submission raise several issues which are also discussed in 
other Bureau submissions to TAC inquiries and related reports. These 
include (i) the 'existence principle'; (i.i) the 'correct' rate of 
adiustment; (iii) the extent of failure in the capital market; and 
(iv) the measurement and provision for farmer and household welfare.
5.2.1 The Existence Principle
This principle (referred to earlier in Chapter 4) is a corollary 
of the tariff compensation arqument. It suaqests that in a 
second-best world, reductions or withdrawal of assistance alreadv 
afforded an activity may cause resources to flow to higher cost 
activities. Tn the context of the Bureau's Longer ^erm Pural 
Adjustment submission it is put forward as one of several reasons whv 
there mav be a general case for maintainina rural assistance. 
However, the Bureau does not regard the principle as being 
particularly relevant to BAS because this scheme confers benefits on 
farmers at the margin rather than the rural sector as a whole. This 
proposition appears to be inconsistent with the economic logic of the 
'existence principle' as discussed in the text of the Bureau's 
submission and above. For if RAS were to be withdrawn, it follows 
that some resources currently employed on farms operating at the 
margin may find improved rewards in higher cost industries elsewhere 
in the rural and non-rural sectors. Therefore, even though RAS 
confers benefits on a well defined subset of the farming population 
and the tariff compensation arqument has potential applicability to a 
wider group of farmers, the 'existence principle' may provide some 
justification, from an economic efficiency perspective, for retaining 
PAS.
5.2.2 The 'Correct,' Pate of Adjustment,
The Rureau's comments on the use of PAS funds for intrasectoral 
rather than inward and outward resource movements raises the difficult 
issue of just how RAS funds might be most usefully employed. The 
Bureau notes (see p.6.1) that the nature of the adjustment problem 
stems from a perception by qovernment. that the rate of farm adjustment 
is unacceptably low such that infervention is required. An adjustment 
policy must, therefore, be sufficiently flexible to respond to a ranqe
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of resource movements. For example, the Bureau refers to the 
potential for RAS to respond to a diminished role of agriculture in 
the economy and the subsequent demand for assistance to facilitate the 
outward movement of resources. Given a budget constraint, the use of 
RAS funds for promoting resource movements out of agriculture will be 
at the expense of other resource adjustment options. The point is, 
according to the Bureau, that a mechanism must be in place to switch 
funds between competing uses, the direction of switching depending 
upon political judgements. This view seems to contrast markedly with 
other arguments put forward by the Bureau in other submissions to the 
IAC. For example, in its submission to the IAC inquiry into 
short-term assistance to the canning fruit industry the Bureau (1982c) 
recommended the introduction of a tree-pull scheme because of a 
demonstrated need to accelerate the process of adjustment. The 
'demonstrated need' arose from a 'number of factors peculiar to 
orcharding'. Also, in its 1975 dried vine fruits submission to IAC, 
the Bureau stressed the inadequacies of the market in the amalgamation 
of fruit blocks.
5.2.3 The Extent of Failure in the Capital Market
Amongst the factors considered by the Bureau in its assessment of 
an efficiency-based case for adjustment assistance is the argument 
that the rural credit market operates imperfectly such that farmers 
are unable to service their adjustment needs. The major source of 
this imperfection is non-price rationing of agricultural credit, 
though it is acknowledged by the Bureau, that for various reasons, the 
extent of this market imperfection is unclear.
The Bureau considers two remedies for imperfections in the rural 
credit market. The preferred remedy (a 'first-best solution') is to 
remove the market failure responsible for farmers being unable to 
obtain sufficient credit. The second-best remedy, which is 
recommended in the event that a first-best solution is not possible, 
is government intervention to assist farmers to secure their credit 
needs which would be demanded in the absence of regulation of the 
financial system. In this way, the Bureau argues (see p. 3.12), 
'...the efficiency of national resource allocation may be increased 
and would certainly not be reduced unless the countervailing 
assistance granted the sector overcompensated for the market 
imperfection rather than only neutralised it'.
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The Bureau's analysis of the rural credit market touches on three 
issues which have been considered in other BAE submissions and related 
reports. These include the nature of the facts pertaining to failure 
in the capital market, how to handle a market imperfection in an 
otherwise first-best world and how to handle a market imperfection in 
a second-best world.
The Bureau's first major investigation of the adequacy of rural
credit facilities was published in 1972 (BAE 1972). This report
concluded that, although short and medium-term credit facilities were
adequate, there was a gap between the supply and demand for long term
credit. A second study which touched on the rural credit market was
prepared by the Bureau (BAE 1974b) following a request by the
Government for the Department of Agriculture and the Treasury to
formulate proposals which may be necessary to assist the beef cattle
industry. A key result of this study (1974b, p. 45) is that the
lending criteria applied by commercial lenders would almost have
certainly resulted in some viable beef producers being denied access
(4)to carry-on finance . A further analysis of rural credit
arrangements was published by the Bureau in 1977 (BAE 1977d) . It 
noted the considerable changes in the sources and types of rural 
credit made available since the early 1970s and concluded that 
additional credit would probably only be demanded if it were available 
on terms and conditions involving some concessional element. In 1983, 
however, the Bureau has again found significant inadequacies present 
in the rural credit market. Of course, it is possible that the rural 
credit market has changed to the extent indicated by the Bureau over 
the past decade. It is also possible, however, that the adequacy of 
rural credit facilities has not changed quite so markedly as suggested 
by BAE publications.
Regardless of the extent of capital market imperfections, there 
is the further issue regarding an efficient response to such 
imperfections. While the solution is straightforward in an otherwise 
distortion-free setting (ie. remove the imperfection), the Bureau 
argues, in its 1983 submission on Longer Term Rural Adjustment, that 
the same solution is the most preferred in a world where other 
distortions would remain subsequent to removal of the imperfection of 
interest. This latter approach is significantly different to that
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outlined in other Bureau submissions. For example, in its 1977 
submission on wheat stabilization (BAE 1977a), the Bureau emphasises 
that caution must be exercised before variations to assistance 
arrangements are proposed because it is not always clear that such 
variations will result in an economically more efficient solution than 
the status quo. In the case of alleged capital market imperfections 
this criterion would suggest that the Bureau would have to be 
confident that resources will not flow from lower to higher cost uses 
as a result of deregulation of the credit market in the presence of a 
range of distortions elsewhere in the economy.
5.2.4 Measurement and Provision for Farmer and Household Welfare
The Bureau's proposal for a household expenditure loan plan 
(HELP) is based on the assessment that existing unemployment benefits 
and provisions of RAS are inadequate to cope with the welfare problems 
of farmers with low incomes. The unemployment benefit, while of some 
use to those farmers who derive a significant proportion of their 
income from off-farm work, is unable to serve the welfare needs of 
self-employed individuals who cannot satisfy the work test and other 
eligibility criteria for this welfare provision as determined by the 
courts ^  . So long as criteria such as the work-test continue to be 
applied (and the Bureau suggests at p. 5.56 that there are several 
reasons why this a preferable strategy) then there will be some 
farmers and other self-employed individuals who are unable to obtain 
social welfare support available to others elsewhere in the community. 
Therefore, the use of alternative measures such as the household 
support provision of RAS, to support impoverished farmers, becomes a 
major consideration in any discussion of rural welfare.
Under the existing provisions of RAS, a farmer may apply for 
(6 )household support if the farm is assessed as non-viable. The 
Bureau's HELP scheme dispenses with the viability criterion and 
attempts to raise household income of eligible farmers and 
self-employed persons up to the level of the unemployment benefit. 
Interestingly, HELP also dispenses with the work-test which the Bureau 
thought should be retained in the case of the unemployment benefit 
scheme.
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Although the eligibility tests for welfare benefits under HELP 
are flexible enough to make the scheme applicable to a wide range of 
farmers experiencing different levels of personal and family hardship, 
the magnitude of assistance offered under the scheme is linked to
- r
considerations other than welfare. In particular, the benefits of 
HELP are significantly less for those farmers who choose to remain in 
farming rather than obtain employment elsewhere. However, in contrast 
to an earlier Bureau study on structural adjustment (Kingma and Samuel 
1977, p.214), there is no provision in HELP for a cost-benefit 
analysis of the adjustment response to assistance afforded under the 
scheme. That is, the scheme seeks to achieve adjustment objectives 
and affords benefits in direct proportion to the extent which 
participants satisfy these objectives but does not distinguish, in 
sign or magnitude, between the respective sizes of participants' net 
gains expressed in terms of resource use efficiency. It was in a not 
dissimilar situation that Kingma and Samuel (1977, p.214) argued that 
welfare payments should be dissociated from structural adjustment 
objectives.
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PART 3
ASSESSMENT OF INCONSISTENCIES CONTAINED IN 
BAE SUBMISSIONS TO IAC INQUIRIES
In Part 3 of this study the data considered in the previous three 
chapters are examined with a view to assessing any inconsistencies 
contained in BAE submissions to IAC inquiries over the past decade. 
Attention is focussed, in Chapter 6, on two aspects of consistency in 
policy evaluation. First, there is the question of whether the Bureau 
has been consistent with respect to the arauments considered in its 
submissions to IAC. Second, there is the further question of whether 
the Bureau has been consistent with respect to the application of 
those arguments considered in its various submissions. Both of these 
questions are addressed in Chapter 6 together with any implications 
their respective answers may have for the hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter 2. In the final chapter of this study (Chapter 7) a summary 
and some concluding remarks are presented.
59
CHAPTER 6
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE FRAMEWORK CONSIDERED AND APPLIED BY BAE
In this chapter any inconsistencies present in the policy 
evaluation framework considered and applied by the BAE in its 
submissions to the IAC and related reports are discussed. The Chapter 
is presented in four sections. In section 6.1 the economic arguments 
used by the Bureau in its various rural industry submissions are 
summarised for use in the remainder of the chapter. Following this, 
in section 6.2, is an evaluation of the consistency of the policy 
evaluation framework considered by the Bureau. In section 6.3 the 
question of whether or not the application of each of the economic 
principles, summarised in section 6.1, to the range of industry 
assistance issues addressed by the Bureau is consistent is examined. 
Finally, in section 6.4, the results of the analysis are discussed 
with respect to the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2.
6.1 Summary of Arguments Contained in BAE Submissions
The reviews in Chapters 3,4 and 5 of economic principles put 
forward by the BAE in its submissions to the IAC and related reports 
suggest nine major arguments of relevance to the industry assistance 
debate. These are discussed briefly below.
6.1.1 IAC Criteria for Short-Term Industry Assistance
The criteria for short term industry assistance outlined by IAC 
(1976) in its 1975-76 Annual Report are used for the purpose of 
minimising inconsistencies which might arise in the treatment of 
industries seeking such assistance. They are presented in this study 
in section 3.1 of Chapter 3 and are referred to by the BAE in its 
submissions to the IAC on short-term assistance for sugar (BAE 1982b) 
and the south-east fishing trawl (BAE 1982d).
6.1.2 Tariff Compensation and the Existence Principle
The 'tariff compensation' argument (see Harris 1975) is that, 
whilst obstacles remain to the removal of assistance to high cost
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industries, a second best approach of assistance to Australian 
agricultural and other export and low-cost import competing industries 
should be adopted. The argument has been cited in many of the 
Bureau's submissions to the IAC (see BAE 1982e, 1983a, c and d for 
recent examples) as have the practical difficulties of its 
implementation. In particular, the Bureau has noted (see, for 
example, Easter et al. 1982) the problems in identifying those firms 
which should be compensated and estimating the appropriate amount of 
compensation. As a result it is difficult to be confident that 
compensation policies will effect a movement of resources from high to 
lower cost activities. A corollary of the 'tariff compensation' 
argument is the 'existence principle'. The latter principle is 
relevant in situations whereby withdrawal or reduction of an 
industry's existing assistance is contemplated. Unless it is known 
that such action is likely to result in a movement of resources from 
higher to lower cost industries there is a strong efficiency-based 
case for retaining the industry's existing assistance (see Easter 
et al. 1982 p. 49).
6.1.3 The Trading-in Argument
'Trading-in' of assistance refers, as the label suggests, to the 
withdrawal of existing industry assistance and replacement with 
alternative assistance measures. Thus, the Bureau's arguments in its 
1982 wheat and 1983 sugar submissions (BAE 1982e, 1983a) represent 
'trade-in' arrangements where the effective rate of assistance may not 
change substantially over time but the composition of support measures 
alters significantly. 'Trading-in' of assistance is usually 
considered in low-cost activities where there may be no case for 
withdrawing or reducing existing assistance but it is envisaged that 
gains in resource-use efficiency can be obtained by substituting 
policy instruments.
6.1.4 The Resource Retention Argument
The 'resource retention' argument has been considered by the 
Bureau in several of its submissions to the IAC (eg. see BAE 1975h, 
1982b, 1983c and d). The thrust of the argument is that in the event 
of a temporary economic downturn in an industry's market outlook, 
assistance is warranted to prevent an outward movement of resources.
Such a movement, the argument suggests, would be contrary to national 
interests because of the temporary nature of the adverse economic 
circumstances confronting the industry.
6.1.5 Output Price Uncertainty
There are two reasons commonly advanced in BAE submissions to the 
IAC as to why the removal of output price uncertainty might be 
warranted. First, price instability, resulting in end product price 
uncertainty, is alleged to have undesirable resource allocative 
effects at the farm level (see BAE's 1977 submission to the IAC on 
wheat price stabilisation). These undesirable effects arise, so the 
argument goes, from the impact of price instability on the structural 
features of farm production. In particular, the producer may need to 
adopt measures such as product diversification, a higher liquid 
compared to non-liquid capital structure and a more versatile input 
mix. Also, output price uncertainty may influence the willingness of 
producers to borrow and to adopt available sources of output raising 
and cost reducing technology. Second, it is suggested (see BAE's 1983 
submission to the IAC on assistance to the dairy industry) that 
modification of output price uncertainty (via export price 
underwriting, for example) may be justified as an income support 
measure.
6.1.6 Imperfections in the Capital Market
Of the market imperfections which might be considered as 
obstacles to the attainment of efficient resource allocation, none has 
been more prominent in Bureau submissions to the IAC than failure in 
the capital market (see, for example, BAE 1983a and d). The nature of 
this market imperfection is the suggestion that banks participate in 
non-price credit rationing which may be caused by '...conservative, 
short-term perceptions or risk averse strategies of institutional 
lenders with respect to the longer term prospects of the rural sector 
and potential farm viability' (BAE 1983d, p. 3.11).
6.1.7 Inadequate Structural Adjustment
The view that the market-determined rate of industry adjustment
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may be less than socially desirable is examined in several submissions 
by the BAE to the IAC, including canning fruit (BAE 1982c), longer 
term rural adjustment (BAE 1983d) and dried vine fruit (BAE 1975h). 
It appears that the autonomous rate of adjustment may be inadeguate 
due to market related factors (BAE 1975h, 1982c) , political judgements 
(BAE 1983d) and welfare considerations (BAE 1982f).
6.1.8 Minimum Level of Welfare
BAE has often expressed the view that intervention may be 
warranted to ensure that rural welfare is maintained at or above some 
minimum community standard (eg. see BAE 1977a, 1983d). The concept of 
affording the entire community a 'safety-net1 continues to be of 
relevance to the rural sector as BAE (1983d, p.3.19) has estimated 
that around 13 to 16 per cent of farmers were continually in a poverty 
situation throughout the 1970s. ^
6.1.9 Conservative Social Welfare Function
While the 'minimum level of welfare' argument is concerned with 
an absolute standard of living, there is a further concept in welfare 
economics which addresses a reduction in real incomes of a section of 
the community. The latter concept is known as the 'conservative social 
welfare function' (see Corden 1974). In terms of welfare weights this 
function gives relatively low and high weights to increases and 
decreases in income respectively such that a decline in income of a 
particular community group is avoided. A useful illustration of the 
relevance of the concept to rural welfare problems is provided in the 
Bureau's submission to IAC on Long-Term Assistance to the Australian 
Sugar Industry (BAE 1983a).
6.2 Consistency in the Framework Considered by the BAE in Submissions
to the IAC
In most of the BAE submissions to the IAC discussed in Part 2 of 
this study, only a few of the abovementioned economic principles are 
considered. An understanding of which arquments were considered in 
each of the submissions can be obtained from inspection of Table 6.1.
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The fact that particular arguments were not considered in all BAE 
submissions to the IAC does not, of course, suggest by itself that 
inconsistent considerations of relevant policy evaluation principles 
have occurred. In many of the cases where particular arguments were 
not considered, the economic circumstances of the industry or the 
terms of reference governing the inquiry meant that it was 
inappropriate to raise particular principles. However, it could be 
argued that the policy evaluation framework is inconsistent if it can 
be demonstrated that there were no such mitigating circumstances.
Inspection of Table 6.1 identifies 9 economic principles (Y^ ) and
18 BAE submissions to IAC inquiries (X.) over the period 1974-83.
Because the IAC criteria for short term assistance (Y ) are relevanty
to only four of these submissions (X^  , Table 6.1 is a matrix
containing 148 observations. Of these observations 41 and 59 per cent 
are in the 'Yes' and 'No' categories respectively.
An asterisk on the 'No' observations is used to denote those
submissions where it may have been appropriate to consider particular
economic arguments which were raised in similar economic circumstances
(2)in other submissions. There are 22 No* observations in Table 6.1,
although this assessment is based solely on the economic circumstances 
described in the submissions themselves which are sometimes 
insufficient for the purpose of evaluating whether or not conditions 
in one industry were essentially the same as in another where 
particular economic argument, (s) are considered. Therefore, it is 
possible that there are cases, in addition to those discussed below, 
where industry circumstances were such that it may have been 
appropriate to consider particular argument(s) given that they had 
been raised in fundamentally similar circumstances elsewhere. Of 
course, it should also be mentioned that unlike many of the studies 
classified in Table 6.1, this study has been carried out with the 
benefit of hindsight. Many of the Bureau's submissions would have 
been prepared prior to recognition and development of particular 
arguments in the Bureau and elsewhere in the agricultural economics 
literature.
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In regard to those 'No' observations which are assigned an 
asterisk in Table 6.1, it is appropriate to comment briefly on the 
means by which each of them have been identified. The analysis 
proceeds down the rows of Table 6.1.
Concerning 'tariff compensation' and the 'existence principle'
(Y^ ) , inconsistencies in the policy framework considered by BAE have
been located in the canning fruit (Y^X^) • dried vine fruit (Y^X^) and
citrus (Y X ) submissions. In all three cases the Bureau concludes 1 9
that there are sufficient grounds for adjustment assistance to be 
provided but the economic principles enunciated in other Bureau 
submissions where the 'tariff compensation' argument is discussed 
suggest that it may have been appropriate for the Bureau to consider 
the flow of resources from lower to higher cost industries that may 
have resulted following the provision of adjustment assistance.
Only one inconsistency has been identified in the Bureau's
consideration of the 'trading-in' argument. This occurs in the 1976
fertilisers submission to the IAC (Y X ) where it is concluded that a2 8
superphosphate bounty is not an appropriate instrument to achieve an 
improvement in resource use efficiency. As mentioned in Chapter 5, 
this conclusion stems mainly from the inelastic nature of 
superphosphate demand at both the regional and aggregate grazing 
industry levels. However, the circumstances surrounding the
preparation of the 1976 fertilisers study might be regarded as being 
very similar to those which prevailed in 1982 when the Bureau prepared 
a further submission to an IAC inquiry into fertiliser subsidies. In 
the latter submission the Bureau also found that a fertiliser subsidy 
is not an appropriate instrument for achieving an improvement in 
efficiency but recommended it should be retained unless a more 
effective method of promoting national income and welfare could be 
identified. It would seem that the possibility of an assistance 
'trade-in' would also have been relevant to the Bureau's 1976 
fertiliser submission to the IAC.
Concerning the 'resources retention' argument (Y ) , it appears
that the economic circumstances prevailing at the time the Bureau
prepared its 1983 submission to the IAC into long term assistance to
the sugar industry (Y X ) were such that the argument may have been3 16
66
relevant to the debate on the industry's level of government support. 
In particular, the Bureau (1983a, p.30) notes, in its discussion of an 
underwriting scheme for the sugar industry, that such a scheme would 
provide assistance when it is most needed (ie. in times of market 
downturn). The 'resources retention' argument may have been relevant 
to an analysis of such a scheme because of the likelihood of resources 
flowing out of this relatively low cost industry during a temporary 
decline in its economic prospects. This argument had been raised in 
similar circumstances on several other occasions identified in Table 
6.1.
While the 'output price uncertainty' argument (Y ) for government 
intervention is considered in many of the Bureau's submissions to the 
IAC, it is not raised in either of the citrus industry reports (see 
and Y4X^2*^ As menti°ne<^  in sub-section 6.1.5, a central 
feature of this argument is that intervention may be warranted to 
avoid the adverse impact of price instability on resource allocation. 
Given the short term variability in citrus prices that occur due to 
phenomena such as the 'Florida Freeze' (BAE 1977c, p. 44) it seems 
that the 'output price uncertainty' argument may have been relevant to 
the Bureau's submissions to IAC inquiries into assistance arrangements 
for the industry.
In regard to consideration by the Bureau of 'imperfections in the
capital market' as an argument (Y ) relevant to the provision of
5
industry assistance, there are several instances documented in Table
6.1 where, given the circumstances under which the argument is raised
elsewhere, it may have also been considered. The suggestion that the
argument (see sub-section 6.1.6 for details) may be relevant to the
case for government intervention is put strongly, for example, in the
Bureau's submission to the IAC's inquiry into long term assistance for
the sugar industry where it is noted that '...capital markets do not
efficiently accommodate risks associated with fluctuations in prices
and production' (BAE 1983a, p.17). Some of the other inquiries where
the same argument may have been relevant include dairy (Y,_Xj. an<^
Y^Xf7 ) , citrus (Yj-Xg and Y^X^) ' wo°^ Y^5 Xll^  ' w^eat (Y^-Y^) an(3
canning fruit (YrX1c).5 lb
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An inadequate rate of structural adjustment is a further argument
(Y^ ) considered in several BAE submissions to the IAC as possible 6
grounds for government intervention. In the Bureau's submission to 
the IAC on Longer Term Rural Adjustment (Yg ^ 8) the Bureau referred to 
the 'imperfect capital market' argument as one reason why government 
intervention may be required to promote the rate of rural adjustment. 
Other reasons cited by the Bureau as to why the market determined rate 
of adjustment may be unsatisfactory from a social perspective include 
the 'demonstrated need' in some industries to promote adjustment, a 
desire by governments to accelerate the autonomous rate of adjustment 
and the household hardship that confronts those with an adjustment 
problem.
The argument that the capital market may be imperfect and farmers 
may be unable, therefore, to secure their capital requirements for 
adjustment purposes appears to have some relevance for several other 
submissions classified in Table 6.1. These include the 1975 dairy 
(Y^XC), 1981 citrus (YrX_„) and 1982 canning fruit (long termD O  o 12
assistance - Y_X._) submissions. At the time the Bureau prepared b lb
these submissions, all of these industries were confronted with 
contractionary pressures and in the case of the 1975 dairy 
submissions, the Bureau (1972) had identified, only a few years 
earlier, several inadequacies in the longer-term credit market.
The 'demonstrated need' to promote adjustment arises from a 
number of farm characteristics documented in the Bureau's 1982 
submission to the IAC inquiry into short term assistance to the 
canning fruit industry. These characteristics (see section 3.4) may 
have also been relevant to the Bureau's citrus and canning fruit (long 
term assistance) industry submissions. In the latter submission a 
tree-pull scheme is examined but it is based on welfare arguments 
rather than the set of farm production characteristics outlined in the 
Bureau's short term assistance submission to the IAC on canning fruit.
While the author could not identify any inconsistencies in the 
framework considered by the Bureau in relation to minimum levels of 
rural welfare (see sub-section 6.1.8), there are several occasions 
mentioned in Table 6.1 where the conservative social welfare function 
(see sub-section 6.1.9) might have been, but was not, discussed.
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These include beef (Y X ) , canning fruit (Y X and Y X ) and theo 1 o J o 1 b
south eastern trawl Fishery (Y X ) . In all of these cases, industryo 4
incomes had undergone or were expected to experience significant 
reductions, thereby raising the possibility of government action. 
Such intervention is discussed, for example, in the Bureau's 1982 
submission to the IAC inquiry into long term assistance to the sugar 
industry where it is noted that deregulation of the domestic market 
may result in capital and revenue losses to existing producers (see 
section 4.3).
The final argument in Table 6.1 is the IAC's set of criteria for
inquiries relating to the provision of short term assistance (see
section 6.1.1). Of the four submissions by the Bureau to such
incuiries there is one occasion (canning fruit - Y X ) where the
(3)criteria are not discussed.
6.3 Consistency in the Application of Economic Principles
In this section of the analysis attention is focussed on the 
identification of any inconsistencies which might be present in the 
BAE's application rather than consideration of economic principles. 
Of particular interest is whether or not arguments classified in Table 
6.1 are uniformly accepted or rejected in the various BAE submissions 
to inquiries conducted by the IAC. The discussion proceeds, as in the 
previous section, in the order of the arguments listed in Table 6.1.
'Tariff compensation' and the 'existence principle' are
considered in 14 of the Bureau's submissions classified in Table 6.1.
In all cases the arguments are regarded by the Bureau as providing a
potential basis for providing or maintaining existing assistance to
rural industries. However, there are significant differences between
the submissions with respect to the amount of detailed information
considered necessary to be confident of an improvement in resource use
efficiency when assistance arrangements are varied. For example, in
some submissions (eg. beef - X^  and sugar - X„^) there is minimal1 16
concern for resource movements between industries following changes to 
assistance arrangements whilst in others (eg. dairy - X and wheat - 
X ) emphasis is placed on likely net movements in GNP caused by
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amendments to the assistance regime. Furthermore, there are 
differences between the Bureau's submissions with respect to the 
implications for industry assistance of accepting the 'tariff 
compensation' argument and the 'existence principle'. For example, in 
its 1983 submission to the IAC's inquiry on longer term structural 
adjustment the Bureau argued that 'tariff compensation', while a 
strong argument for sector-wide assistance, could not be invoked 
validly for the purpose of retaining adjustment assistance to a 
marginal group of farmers. This approach contrasts markedly with the 
typical industry (partial) evaluation of industry assistance 
undertaken by the BAE and the IAC.
The concept of 'trading-in' existing for alternative assistance 
measures has appeared in 4 of the Bureau's more recent submissions to 
IAC inquiries (see Table 6.1). In all of these cases the Bureau 
attempts to identify superior means of assistance from efficiency 
and/or welfare perspectives. There are two points of interest so far 
as differences in the application of the 'trading-in' argument are 
concerned. First, there is the question of the target level of 
assistance before and after the 'trade-in'. Second, there is the 
critical issue of the amount of attention focussed on inter-industry 
movement of resources following an amendment to the assistance 
structure, a subject which is also addressed above in the discussion 
of the Bureau's application of the 'tariff compensation' argument and 
the 'existence principle'.
Concerning the level of assistance afforded an industry or group
of producers before and after a 'trade-in', the Bureau has adopted
several approaches. In the case of the Bureau's 1982 wheat submission
to the IAC (X ) it is argued that the current level of assistance
should be maintained and attention should be focussed on '...the
effectiveness of assistance arrangements'. This approach contrasts
with that adopted in sugar (X.^ ) and longer term structural adjustment
(X ) where there is no suggestion as to what may be the appropriate 18
target level of assistance and fertilisers (X^) where it is 
recommended that public expenditure saved through removal of the 
fertiliser subsidies might be reinvested elsewhere in the form of 
'...more efficacious rura] assistance measures'. Of course, the
/ u
latter simple reallocation of public expenditure on one form of 
assistance to another may not result in the effective rate of 
assistance being maintained.
In regard to the effort made by the Bureau to examine the likely 
changes in resource use following the implementation of a 'trade-in', 
all 4 submissions say very little about prospective variations in 
consumption or production of the assisted output or input and their 
respective substitutes and complements. Of course, such analyses are 
often not possible in the time made available by IAC inquiries but it 
is significant to note that several submissions classified in Table 
6.1 (wheat - X , canning fruit - X^  and dairy - X^ .,) do examine, in 
the context of 'tariff compensation’, the likely pattern of 
inter-industry resource movements following a change in assistance 
arrangements.
The 'resources retention' argument is evaluated in 6 of the 
Bureau's submissions classified in Table 6.1. Interestingly, the 
Bureau's attitude towards the 'resources retention' argument varies 
significantly between the submissions. At one extreme are the
Bureau'1 s thoughts in its submission to the IAC on longer term
rural adjustment (X ) where it islo argued (p. 3.14) that the
'resources retention argument' provides '... prima facie support for 
intervention in the adjustment process...'. At the other is the view 
expressed in the Bureau's 1982 submission to IAC's inquiry into 
short-term assistance for the sugar industry (see section 3.3) where 
serious reservations are expressed about the validity of the 
'resources retention' argument. In between these two extremes is a 
spectrum of attitudes towards the 'resources retention' argument 
including tentative acceptance (dairy - X ) , acceptance in principle 
but support for government intervention only in the event of 
demonstrable net economic benefits (wheat -X and dried vine fruit - 
X^) and acceptance in principle but reiection of government 
intervention except for dissemination of market outlook information to 
the industry of interest (beef - X^).
The 'output price uncertainty' argument appears in 6 of the 
Bureau's submissions classified in Table 6.1. Sometimes it is 
considered together with the 'resources retention' argument as a 
possible efficiency oriented basis for government intervention (see,
for example, wheat - X and dairy - X^) . However, it differs
from the 'resources retention' argument in that it is more concerned 
with the effect of price instability on the trade-off between producer 
security and profits and underinvestment rather than the movement of 
resources in response to a temporary economic downturn (see 
subsections 6.1.4 and 6.1.5).
Inspection of the 6 submissions where the 'output price
uncertainty' argument is considered reveals several Bureau
perspectives on its validity. In both the dairy submissions (X_ and
X^7) it is suggested that output price uncertainty may lead to a less
than optimum use of resources. A similar view is expressed in the
Bureau's 1980 submission to the IAC inquiry into wood and wood
products (X^) where it is noted that it may be appropriate to provide
a more certain production and investment environment. The effects of
output price uncertainty on production and investment are also
referred to in the Bureau's 1983 sugar submission (X^ )^ but it is an16
inadequate capital market which denies producers the opportunity to 
cope with the effects of price instability rather than output price 
instability per se which is identified as the basis for government 
intervention. A more circumspect approach is advocated in the 
Bureau's 1977 wheat submission (X^) . In particular, it is argued 
that price instability has undesirable effects at the farm level but 
before stabilisation policies are implemented, the Bureau recommends 
that net benefits of such intervention need to be identified. In the 
case of the wheat industry the Bureau (1977a, p. VII. 7) concludes 
that such benefits may not be present because of the possibility of 
other low cost industries competing for resources and diminishing 
returns to expanded wheat production. Finally, output price 
uncertainty, as a basis for government intervention, is raised in the 
Bureau's 1982 submission to IAC on short term assistance for the sugar 
industry. (X^). On this occasion the Bureau (p. 25) recognises that 
there is also an opposing school of thought to the view that export 
price uncertainty may affect adversely the levels of output and 
investment in the sugar industry. Presumably, the Bureau is referring 
to the work of Demset.z (1969) and others (eg. Lloyd 1977) who have 
argued that risk reduction is an economic good which must be 
incorporated into the notion of efficiency. As it turns out, the
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Bureau finds it unnecessary to commit itself to acceptance or 
rejection of the 'output price uncertainty' argument in this short 
term assistance submission because of the longer term rather than 
temporary nature of export price uncertainty in the sugar market.
'Imperfections in the capital market' are considered as a possible
basis for government intervention in 5 of the Bureau's submissions
classified in Table 6.1. On all occasions (fertilisers - X. and X„,6 8
dried vine fruit - X7, sugar - X and longer term rural adjustment 
- X ) the Bureau is of the opinion that if such imperfections are 
present they should be acted upon, preferably directly rather than 
indirectly through manipulation of some other output or input price. 
Nevertheless, it is of interest to note that the Bureau has published 
several assessments of the rural credit market which suggest that, at 
various times over the past decade, rural credit facilities have been 
burdened with market imperfections. Indeed, according to the BAE, 
rural credit arrangements have moved from being inadequate in 1972 to 
satisfactory in 1977 but possibly inadequate again in 1983.
'An inadequate rate of structural adjustment' is considered as an
argument for industry assistance in five of the Bureau's submissions
to the IAC. On two occasions (fertilisers - X and X ) it is8 13
considered simply in the context of a government policy objective. On
two others (citrus - X and canning fruit - X ) it is discussed in a9 3
resource use efficiency context and in one (longer term rural
adjustment - X ) it is evaluated on both efficiency and welfare 18
grounds. As the Bureau's approach to adjustment assistance, in a 
welfare context, is outlined only once in the submissions classified 
in Table 6.1, discussion of the Bureau's comments on welfare 
assistance, in its longer term rural adjustment submission, is left to 
later in this section where general welfare based assistance is 
examined.
The notion of providing assistance to accelerate the rate of
structural adjustment and thereby improve resource use efficiency is
not uniformly accepted by the Bureau. In its submission on longer
term rural adjustment (X ) the Bureau acknowledges a general case for18
assistance to agriculture on efficiency grounds but concludes that
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there are no substantive grounds for providing selective assistance to
marginal units rather than more efficient farms. In fact, the Bureau
concludes that a decision to continue or terminate RAS must be
regarded as a political judgement. In contrast, the Bureau, in its
1977 citrus (X ) and 1982 canning fruit submissions (X ) , identifies 9 3
particular industries which exhibit characteristics that make it clear 
that there is a 'demonstrated need' to promote adjustment. 
Furthermore, the factors identified in these submissions as being 
responsible for the 'demonstrated need' to accelerate adjustment do 
not coincide with the efficiency based case for adjustment assistance 
outlined in the Bureau's longer term rural adjustment submission. In 
particular, in the latter submission the Bureau (1983d, p. 4) remarks 
that 'Care is required that a perception of an adjustment 'problem' is 
well founded ...' and '...apparent divergence between the sale and 
offer prices for rural labour and assets may be entirely consistent 
with traditional economic principles of efficient resource 
allocation'. These comments appear to be relevant to both the canning 
fruit and citrus submissions where it is argued that a number of 
factors peculiar to orcharding (eg. small properties, fixed
investments and long investment/production lags) may justify government 
assistance.
The concept of affording welfare assistance to farmers so that a 
minimum standard of living is maintained is put forward in 14 of the 
Bureau's submissions classified in Table 6.1. While there is general 
agreement concerning the justification for intervention to relieve 
hardship, there are two aspects of the welfare assistance debate that 
are not treated uniformly in the submissions. The first is the choice 
by the Bureau of variables to measure farm household welfare. The 
second is the selection of instruments to handle identified welfare 
problems.
In regard to the measurement of household welfare the most
popular criterion is farm income. This measure is adopted in many
submissions including beef (X^ ) , canning fruit (X^ ) , the south eastern
trawl fishery (X ) , fertilisers (X , X ), citrus (X ) and4 o 13 12
longer-term rural adjustment (X ) . Recognition that household18
welfare might be influenced by other variables (in particular, net 
worth) is given in four of the Bureau's submissions classified in
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Table 6.1 (sugar - X_ , dairy - X_ , citrus - X_ and longer term ruralZ b  9
adjustment X ) and three other papers published by the Bureau 
(Cuthbertson et al. 1974, Stoeckel et al. 1974 and Martin and 
Farquharson 1982). Cuthbertson et al (1974) attempted to measure 
family welfare in terms of the flow of goods and services a family can 
command. Factors relevant to this criterion are said to include 
annual money income, non-pecuniary income, family assets and the 
influence of public sector services on family consumption levels. The 
significance of including both income and net worth in measurements of 
household welfare is noted in Stoeckel et al. (1974) where it is found 
that farm families, while earning lower incomes than non-farm families 
tend to possess relatively greater wealth. Consequently, conversion 
of wealth into an income flow and adding it to income could be 
expected to reduce any inequalities between family well being of farm 
and non-farm households.
Concerning the selection of instruments to deal with rural 
welfare problems there are basically two approaches outlined in BAE 
submissions to the IAC. First, there are those submissions which 
stress the need to focus on the welfare problem itself when 
considering alternative policy instruments. Included in this category 
are the Bureau's 1977 wheat submission (X.^ ) where it is argued that 
welfare goals are pursued more appropriately through broadly based 
direct measures rather than wheat price stabilisation and the two 
fertiliser submissions (X and X ) which refer to the superiority of 
direct measures over input subsidies as welfare policy instruments. 
In contrast, several other Bureau submissions outline proposals which 
do not work directly on household welfare. In the two canning fruit 
submissions (X and X._) a tree-pull scheme is recommended as a 
welfare instrument. It is clear that under such a scheme benefits 
accruing to producers would be directly proportional to the number of 
trees pulled and may bear little relationship to the income status of 
individuals. Also, the Bureau's 1983 dairy submission (X.^ ) outlines 
a market underwriting scheme designed, amongst other things, to 
address welfare problems of dairy industry households. Such a scheme 
could be expected to confer benefits in direct proportion to the size 
of a farm's output rather than the adequacy of a household's income. 
Finally, in the Bureau's 1983 submission to the IAC on longer term 
rural adjustment, a household expenditure loan plan which raises
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household income of eligible farmers to the level of the unemployment, 
benefit, is proposed. This scheme works on income but affords 
benefits in proportion to the adjustment choices of farmers. In 
particular, benefits of the proposal are smaller for those farmers who 
choose to remain in farming rather than obtain employment elsewhere.
Use is made of the conservative social welfare function in three
submissions classified in Table 6.1. These include sugar (X__),16
longer term rural adjustment (X ) and citrus (X ) . In all threelo lZ
submissions the Bureau recognises that a decision to offset capital or 
revenue losses caused by variations in assistance arrangements or some 
adverse development in an industry's economic environment must be 
politically determined. There are no inconsistencies in the 
application of this argument.
The final argument listed in Table 6.1 concerns the Bureau's 
application of the criteria for short term assistance developed by the 
IAC and first published in its 1975-76 Annual Report (see section 
3.1). These criteria are considered in two Bureau submissions, namely
its.sugar (X^ ) and the south eastern trawl fishery (X^). In both 
submissions the Bureau considers it appropriate to assess the case for 
short-term assistance in terms of the Commission's published criteria. 
However, only in sugar does the Bureau present an independent 
perspective on efficiency aspects of short-term assistance. In fact, 
in sugar, the Bureau concludes that even though it does not support a 
case for short term assistance on efficiency grounds, it is 
appropriate to evaluate the industry against the IAC's criteria in 
order to achieve a consistent approach to temporary assistance policy.
6.4 Discussion of Results and Hypotheses
In the previous two sections the Bureau's consideration and 
application of industry assistance arguments are examined respectively 
with emphasis placed on the consistency perspective. A useful 
extension of this analysis may have been to examine the extent to 
which the conclusions of BAE submissions to IAC inquiries are affected 
when inconsistencies present in the policy evaluation framework are 
removed. However, a decision was taken by the author not to pursue
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such an analysis because of differences in the Bureau's attitude to 
many of the industry assistance arguments. That is, it is not 
possible to decide whether the arguments listed in Table 6.1 would 
have been accepted or rejected in those submissions where economic 
circumstances suggested they should at least have been considered.
Although no attempt is made here to compare the conclusions of BAE 
submissions to IAC inquiries with and without any inconsistencies 
identified in the previous two sections, there are a number of 
comments to be made in relation to the hypotheses outlined in section 
2.4 of Chapter 2. For convenience, these hypotheses are repeated 
below:
(1) BAE does not contribute to any inconsistency and uncertainty 
which might characterise the policy evaluation principles and 
policies relating to rural industry assistance; and
(2) BAE does not discriminate between rural industries in its 
application of policy evaluation procedures.
While it is not possible to examine hypotheses (1) and (2) via
formal significance testing methods, the results discussed in this
chapter do suggest that the BAE may have contributed to the level of
uncertainty surrounding rural industry assistance, policy 
(4)evaluation. Moreover, it is clear that many inconsistencies
reported in sections 6.2 and 6.3 occur between industry submissions, 
thereby suggesting some discriminatory treatment of assistance to 
rural activities.
There are, however, several qualifications that need to be made 
to the abovementioned remarks before summarising the principal 
results. First, the structure of this study is such that attention is 
focussed on the Bureau's negative contribution to consistency, 
uncertainty and discriminatory treatment of industry assistance. Of 
course, this approach is useful in that it facilitates identification 
of those areas of policy evaluation which may require further 
attention. Nevertheless, it is important to exercise caution when 
using the results reported in this study for the purpose of addressing 
the overall consistency of the framework adopted in the Bureau's
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submissions to the IAC and related reports. Second, there is no 
suggestion that inconsistencies and any consequent industry 
discrimination discussed in this chapter are intentional. There is a 
host of reasons including developments in the discipline, personnel 
changes and varying terms of reference and reporting times in the IAC 
inquiries themselves which could account for discrimination in the 
policy evaluation process. Finally, it is unlikely that 
inconsistencies in policy evaluation are confined to BAE submissions 
to IAC inquiries. Indeed, Edwards (1980) has noted the presence of 
inconsistencies in IAC reports but nevertheless points to the 
important contribution the IAC has made to our understanding of rural 
industry assistance problems. In a similar vein the author of this 
study is confident that the quality of IAC rural reports and policy 
making would suffer without the contribution of the BAE to the 
industry assistance inquiry process.
Much of the evidence concerning hypotheses (1) and (2) has 
already been discussed in sections 6.2 and 6.3. Hence, attention is 
now focussed on summarising those results in a form of direct 
relevance to hypotheses (1) and (2).
Concerning hypothesis (1) it is clear that inconsistencies stem 
from two sources. First, there are quite a few occasions documented 
in Table 6.1 and described in section 6.2 where economic circumstances 
of an industry under inquiry were sufficiently similar to those 
prevailing in other industries which were also the subject of IAC 
inquiries, thereby suggesting that arguments concerning assistance put 
forward on these latter occasions may have also been relevant to the 
former group of submissions where they are not raised. The incidence 
of these inconsistencies ranges across all of the arguments classified 
in Table 6.1 except for the 'minimum level of welfare' argument which 
is consistently raised by the Bureau whenever circumstances warrant 
it. Second, inconsistencies arise with respect to the Bureau's 
application of industry assistance arguments. These are varied in 
nature but a simple classification would include the following 
components:
. Inconsistencies with respect to validity of arguments ('resource
retention', 'inadequate structural adjustment' and 'output price
uncertainty' ) ;
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. Inconsistencies concerning the amount of information required to 
be confident of an improvement in resource use efficiency 
following intervention ('tariff compensation', the 'existence 
principle' and 'trading in');
. Possibly conflicting assessments of the nature and extent of 
market imperfections ('imperfect capital market');
Inconsistencies concerning the implications of accepting a case 
for retaining assistance ('existence principle' and 
'trading-in');
. Varying treatment of the target level of assistance when applying 
the 'trading-in' argument;
Differences in the choice of measure for assessing rural welfare 
and the selection of instruments to address welfare problems; and
Variations in adherence to IAC criteria for provision of 
short-term assistance.
The summary of relevant results for hypothesis (1) is also 
pertinent to hypothesis (2) because many of these inconsistencies 
occur between different industry submissions. This point can be 
verified by inspection of the results discussed in sections 6.2 and 
6.3.
Having discussed inconsistencies present in BAF submissions to 
IAC inquiries it is appropriate to refer back to Chapter 2 where 
Kaufmann's proposals for solution of inconsistencies are outlined. In 
particular, pursuit of a consistent policy evaluation framework, as 
defined by Kaufmann, would require the elimination of all arguments 
inconsistent with other arguments accepted into the policy evaluation 
framework. Applying Kaufmann's guidelines to the present 
study suggests two courses of action. The first concerns those 
inconsistencies identified in the Bureau's consideration of economic 
arguments relevant to the industry assistance debate. Given that the 
recognition of an argument in some submissions and the neglect of it
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in others where economic circumstances are similar may be seen as an 
inconsistency in the form of a disagreement over the relevance of that 
argument, it follows that there may be a case for careful 
co-ordination of industry submissions. Such co-ordination may ensure 
that arguments are at least considered when particular circumstances 
arise. In a policy evaluation framework which can be expected to 
change with progress in the discipline itself this may be a formidable 
task but the benefits in the form of reduced uncertainty and a less 
discriminatory treatment of industry assistance may justify such an 
undertaking. The second concerns inconsistencies identified in the 
application of the Bureau's industry assistance arguments. Following 
Kaufmann, it may be appropriate to take stock regularly of alternative 
viewpoints on the necessary and sufficient conditions for government 
intervention on efficiency and welfare related grounds. The principle 
benefit of such an exercise would be the use of a common set of 
principles at any point in time, though it is acknowledged that there 
may be a considerable research effort necessary for its execution.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The main concern of this study is consistency in industry 
assistance policy evaluation with particular reference to the 
submissions made by the BAF to the public inquiry process conducted by 
the IAC. The definition of consistency adopted in this study is that 
outlined by Kaufmann. It focusses on the identification of 
incompatible propositions with a view to the removal of contradictions 
from an analytical framework.
In Chapter 2 the significance of consistency in policy evaluation 
is outlined. Particular attention is given to equity and efficiency 
as motives for maintaining a consistent approach to industry 
assistance. It is argued that the TAC appears to be concerned 
primarily with equity in its attempts to extend a single advisory 
process to all sectors and that any discriminatory treatment of 
entities affected by the industry assistance, public inquiry process 
may prejudice an industry's claims for public support. In addition, 
it is noted that consistency in the use of industry assistance 
criteria minimises the level of uncertainty in the market for 
assistance and related producer and consumer markets. Inspection of 
both the theoretical and empirical literature on risk and uncertainty 
suggests that inconsistencies in policy evaluation may affect the 
behaviour of the household and the firm, factor demand and national 
income.
A review of policy evaluation arguments contained in BAF 
submissions to the IAC and related reports is oresented in Part 2 of 
the study. The purposes of this review are to identity the major 
economic arguments perceived by the Bureau to be relevant to the 
provision of rural industry assistance and to compare and contrast 
these arguments in preparation for the more detailed analysis of Part 
3 of the study. The discussion is presented in three chapters which 
deal respectively with short-term assistance, lonqer term assistance 
for rural outputs and assistance for the use of inputs and structural 
adjustment.
From the review in Part 2, 9 economic arguments relevant to rural 
industry assistance are distilled in Chapter 6. These include:
. IAC criteria for short-term industry assistance;
. tariff compensation and the existence principle;
. trading-in;
. resource retention;
. output price uncertainty;
. imperfections in the capital market;
. inadequate structural adjustment;
. minimum level of welfare; and
. conservative social welfare function.
A detailed assessment of the Bureau's consideration and application of 
these arguments is also presented in Chapter 6. It was found (see 
section 6.2) that there are quite a few occasions where economic 
circumstances of an industry under inquiry were sufficiently similar 
to those prevailing in other industries which were also the subject of 
IAC inquiries, thereby suggesting that arguments put forward on these 
latter occasions may have also been relevant to the former submissions 
where they were not raised. Also, a variety of inconsistencies arise 
with respect to the Bureau's application of industry assistance 
arguments. These are discussed in section 6.3 and summarised in 
section 6.4.
While it is concluded that the BAE may have contributed to the 
level of uncertainty surrounding rural industry assistance, policy 
evaluation and be responsible for some discriminatory treatment of 
arguments pertaining to assistance to rural activities, there are 
several qualifications that need to be made with respect to the main 
results. First, the results come from a study which focusses 
attention on the Bureau's negative contribution to consistency, 
uncertainty and discriminatory treatment of industry assistance and 
cannot, therefore, be used for the purpose of addressing the overall 
consistency of the framework adopted in the Bureau's submissions to 
the IAC and related reports. Second, there is no suggestion that
identified inconsistencies are intentional. Indeed, inconsistencies 
may arise from a variety of sources documented in section 6.4. 
Finally, it is likely that many organisations involved over a period
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of time with policy evaluation arguments will exhibit inconsistencies 
in their work. This alone cannot be used as a performance measure 
and, in the case of the Bureau, it is relevant to recall Warhurst's 
comments (see Chapter 2) that the BAE is an agency '...of the highest 
status...' whose work is '...crucial to a successful IAC inquiry into 
primary industry'. Nevertheless, the inconsistencies identified in 
this study do emphasise the substantial benefits that may be 
associated with careful co-ordination and regular stock-taking of 
necessary and sufficient grounds for industry assistance.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER 2
1. Technically, the IAC could initiate an inquiry into aspects
of government assistance to an industry which has not been 
examined for some years. However, Warhurst (1983, p. 75)
notes that this power was never utilised.
2. Kaldor (1959) and Hicks (1940) proposed alternatives to the
Pareto criterion. Kaldor sought to overcome the restrictive 
requirements of the Pareto criterion whereby a social welfare 
improvement could only result if a policy improved the
welfare of all members of a community. In particular, 
Kaldor introduced the hypothetical compensation principle 
which suggested that a policy is desirable if as a result, 
'...it is possible to make some people better off ...without
making anybody worse off...' (Kaldor 1959, p. 550). Hicks
developed this approach by suggesting that a policy may be
regarded as desirable if it would be impossible in the
prepolicy situation to make all individuals at least as well
off as they will be as a result of introduction of the
policy. Scitovsky (1941) noted that the Kaldor criterion 
could lead to a contradiction whereby the absence of
compensatory payments following a policy change could lead
to the conclusion that implementation and abandonment of a 
policy may be desirable simultaneously. Scitovsky proposed 
that this problem could be overcome by the requirement that 
a policy must satisfy both the Kaldor and Hicks criteria. 
That is, a policy could be socially desirable if (a) it 
would be possible as a result, to make some people better 
off without making anyone else worse off and (b) it would be 
impossible, by reversing the policy, to make everyone at 
least as well off.
3. These measures are discussed in detail in IAC (1983).
4. For analysis of the effects of uncertainty on output in the
cases of duopoly and oligopoly see Hey (1979) and Cyert and 
Degroot (1970a and b).
CHAPTER 3
1. The final principle was discussed in the 1975-76 Annual Report of 
the IAC but not listed formally in the set of criteria for 
short-term assistance. However, it is listed in the set of 
criteria made available for witnesses intending to present 
evidence to inquiries on short-term assistance. See, for 
example, IAC (1982)
2. The effective rate of protection measures net assistance to an 
industry's value adding activities afforded by the assistance 
structure. It may be defined as the difference between value 
added per unit measured in assisted and unassisted prices, 
expressed as a percentage of value added per unit measured in 
unassisted prices.
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CHAPTFR 4
1. Details of assistance afforded to growers on the domestic market 
are described in Appendix A.l of RAF (1987e).
2. This recommendation was deleted in the Bureau's subsequent 
publication on assistance to the pi wood industry (see Parsons 
et al 19R2).
3. In 1980-81 the effective rates of assistance for fruit and 
vegetable activities ranged from -5 per cent for dried vine 
fruits to 37 per cent for wine grapes.
4. The Bureau estimated the effective rate of protection for the 
citrus enterprise to be 60 per cent in 1974-75.
CHAP'T'FF 5
1. The household welfare issues considered in the Bureau's 1987
report are largely the same as those outlined in its 1976 report.
3. Of course, it is true that the demand elasticity for
superphosphate is non-zero (estimated by BAE (IB^Bb to be -0.3) 
which sugqests that there will be some reduction in 
superphosphate use following withdrawal of the subsidy. There 
is, therefore, a problem of deciding how inelastic the demand for 
an input must be before it is decided that variations in price 
will not significantly affect the quantity demanded. Some
guidance might be obtained from Easter et al. (1983, p. 43) where 
it is concluded that '...fertiliser subsidies are not likely to 
be effective in stimulating increased use'
3. The main provisions of the Rural Adiustment Scheme (RAS) are 
outlined in Appendix 3.
4. The maior reasons underlying this assessment are that the trading 
banks did not normally lend against the security of livestock 
mortgages and the pastoral houses viewed financing as an activity 
ancillary to their maior functions as stock agents, wool brokers 
and suppliers of farm inputs. Other credit institutions such as 
the CDB and the rural reconstruct ion authorities were more 
involved with lonaer term credit although an expansion in their 
short term debt refinancing could release funds provided by 
traditional lenders for normal carry-on purposes.
5. The Bureau (1983d, p. 5.54) notes that recent legal action 
suggests that farmers, in order to be eligible for unemployment 
benefits, must demonstrate a lack of permanent further commitment 
to farming.
6. Details of household support are provided in Appendix 1.
CHAPTER 6
1. A Further aspect of welfare not discussed here but considered bv 
the Bureau (see BAF 1983d) is the distribution of income and 
wealth between groups in the community.
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2. A decision was taken by the author to use the ’Yes' rather than
the 'No' observations of Table 6.1 as the basis for identifying 
inconsistencies in policy evaluation arguments considered by the 
Bureau. An alternative procedure is to begin with the 'No' cells 
of Table 6.1 but this was not adopted because of the variations 
in the economic circumstances underlying these observations. In 
contrast, the economic circumstances underlying those submissions 
where particular arguments are considered are reasonably uniform, 
thereby making it somewhat less difficult to identify
inconsistencies. While it can be expected that the results will 
display some sensitivity to the choice of a 'starting point' for 
the analysis, it is clear that both methods of analysis are 
capable of addressing the issues discussed earlier in the 
section.
3. The Bureau's 1975 submission to the IAC inquiry into short term 
assistance to the beef industry was prior to the Commission's 
publication (in 1976) of its short-term assistance criteria.
4. Recall from Chapter 2 that BAE submissions are only an input into
the industry assistance inquiry process conducted by the IAC. 
Therefore, the reflection of any inconsistencies contained in BAE 
submissions in reports published by the IAC will depend upon how 
presiding IAC Commissioners regard the relevance and
persuasiveness of BAE arguments.
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APPENDIX 1
INDUSTRY ASSISTANCE ARRANGEMENTS
In this appendix assistance afforded to each of the rural 
industries covered in Part 2 of the study is outlined. Much of the 
material presented here is drawn from IAC (1983) and may not, 
therefore, be an accurate description of assistance arrangements 
prevailing at the time the BAE prepared its respective submissions. 
Nevertheless, readers may find it convenient to refer to this appendix 
in order to obtain some understanding of industry assistance 
arrangements. For further details on current and historical rural 
industry assistance the reader is referred to IAC (1983) and the 
respective IAC inquiry publications.
Al.1 Beef Cattle Grazing
In most years the production of beef and veal has received little
assistance. However, over the period 1970-71 to 1980-81, the 
effective rate of assistance has fluctuated substantially (from 26 per 
cent in 1977-78 to 2 per cent in 1979-80).
Measures currently assisting the production of beef and veal 
include:
. government contributions towards the costs associated with 
inspection of beef and veal exports;
contributions towards cattle research through the Meat Research 
Trust Account administered by the Australian Meat Research 
Committee and also through research carried out by the 
Commonwealth Scientific Industrial Research Organisation (CSIPO);
. reduced fertiliser costs through the operation of the phosphate 
fertiliser bounty; and
. general concessions available to agricultural activities such as 
access to concessional credit and income taxation concessions.
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Major assistance to beef cattle grazing was provided through the 
Beef Industry Incentive Payments Scheme - $85 million in 1977-78 and 
$32 million in 1978-79. In addition, beef producers have been major 
recipients of assistance provided by joint Commonwealth/State schemes 
such as the current RAS and the campaign for the eradication of bovine 
brucellosis and tuberculosis. Commonwealth funding has also been 
provided in recent years to help develop a Beef Carcase Classification 
Scheme.
A1.2 Dairying
Dairying is considered as being comprised of two sectors; market 
milk for human consumption and manufacturing milk used for the 
production of dairy products. This separation is largely determined 
by the nature of State regulation of the market milk sector, supported 
by the Commonwealth in its funding of assistance measures and through 
its unproclaimed legislation relating to the current marketing 
arrangements. Regulation of the market milk sector varies from State 
to State and is designed to restrict supply of market milk, thereby 
maintaining market milk prices above the equivalent price of milk for 
manufacturing purposes. Marketing arrangements for manufacturing milk 
operate within this framework and allow for manufactured dairy 
products to be sold on the domestic market at prices which differ from 
those on export markets.
In addition to the assistance effects of marketing arrangements, 
dairying has benefited from specific Commonwealth outlays and general 
assistance measures for agricultural activities. General measures 
include Commonwealth contributions to research and extension services 
and fertiliser subsidies. The sector has also benefited 
from adjustment schemes such as the Marginal Dairy Farms 
Reconstruction Scheme and the Dairy Adjustment Programme which applied 
to dairying and others such as the Rural Reconstruction Scheme and the 
PAS which apply to the entire agricultural sector. Commonwealth 
contributions to the bovine brucellosis and tuberculosis eradication 
campaian have also benefited dairying.
The manufacturing milk sector has received Commonwealth support 
through Rudget outlays to a much greater extent than the market milk
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sector. Devaluation compensation has been paid in particular years, 
includinq $12.7 million in 1970-71 and $2.6 million 1971-77. 
Production bounties tor butter, cheese and processed milk products 
were paid until 1975-76, partly as an inducement to maintain a 
voluntary price difference between export and domestic markets. The 
amounts paid totalled over $144 million for the period covered. More 
recently, the Commonwealth has underwritten the prices received for 
dairy products. Amounts paid out under this scheme were $6.2 million 
in 1977-7R, $12.4 million in 1978-79, $17.7 million in 1979-RO, and 
$1.6 million in 1980-81.
A1.3 Wheat. Crowing
Pates of assistance accorded this activity have fluctuated 
substantially. For example, in each of the years 1970-71 to 1972-73, 
effective rates of assistance for wheat qrowina exceeded 30 per cent. 
In contrast, since 1973-74, the effective rates of assistance have not 
been above 10 per cent and in several years have been negative.
The maior factors determining the level of assistance to wheat 
growing are the marketing arrangements which have provided for 
domestic prices to be set administratively and for minimum returns to 
growers. Price discrimination between domestic and export markets for 
wheat is facilitated by an embargo on wheat imports. Operation of the 
home consumption pricing arrangements has assisted wheat growing in 
some years and penalised it in others - depending upon v/hether 
domestic prices are above or below export prices. Wheat returns have 
also been subiect to either price guarantees or underwriting. 
Commonwealth payments to support wheat returns were made in 1970-71 
and 1972-73.
The Australian Wheat Board (AWP) sells wheat at a uniform price 
in all Australian capital cities. To finance the costs of shippinc 
wheat to Tasmania, a loading is imposed bv the AWP on all domestic 
(mainland! sales of wheat for human consumption: in 1980-81 this 
amounted to $2.78 per tonne.
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Wheat growing has benefited substantially from the AWB's access 
to concessional credit through the Rural Credits Department of the 
Reserve Bank. The first advance payments to wheatgrowers under the 
Wheat Stabilisation Plans were financed by loans at concessional rates 
of interest. However, since 1979-80, the AWB has been requested by 
the Government to partly finance its first advance payments to growers 
from commercial borrowings. Consequently, the AWB has over recent 
years obtained an increasing proportion of its seasonal finance by the 
issue of promissory notes and bank-accepted commercial bills. In
1981-82, for the first time, the AWB's total requirements were 
obtained from commercial sources. To offset the additional costs 
incurred by the AWB, the Government has reimbursed the AWB from Budget 
appropriations.
' Wheat growing has also been assisted in recent years by general 
forms of assistance available to the agricultural sector such as 
government contributions to export inspection services, agricultural 
,-extension - services,.k scientific .„re search, fertiliser, subsidies, .an^., 
schemes designed to facilitate structural adjustment/reconstruction.
Al.4 Grape growing for dried vine fruits
Assistance afforded the growing of grapes for processing into 
dried vine fruits has fluctuated, with effective rates of assistance 
ranging from 73 per cent in 1970-71 to -5 per cent in 1980-81.
These variations in the levels of assistance arise mainly due to 
fluctuations in producer transfers resulting from movements in the 
. * administered-domestic . price and export..prices,.ofjuried vine fruits- 
Industry control of domestic prices and supplies of fruit and a tariff 
on imports (currently set at a genera], rate $0.08 per kg plus 7 per 
cent ad valorem) has enabled a considerable margin to be established 
between export and domestic prices in most years.
Under the operation o- the stabilisation scheme, Government 
contributions have been made in those years when there were 
insufficient funds available to make the required stabilisation 
payments. Government net contributions totalling $3.1 million were 
made in 1971-72, 1972-73, 1973-74, 1976-77 and 1977-80. In other 
years, returns were in excess of support prices.
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Since 1978 a levy/disbursement, mechanism has operated to maintain 
the domestic prices of dried vine ^ruits. Since 1982 underwriting 
arrangements have replaced the stabilisation scheme.
Additional minor assistance has been provided to dried vine
fruits by measures designed to assist the agricultural sector
generally, such as subsidised agricultural extension services,
fertiliser subsidies and schemes funded by the Commonwealth to
facilitate adjustment of agricultural activities. 
M .5 Citrus Fruit Growing
Australian citrus fruit growing has been a relatively highly 
assisted agricultural activity. Since 1977-78 this activity has had 
an effective rate of assistance of over 60 per cent. Oranaes are the 
main citrus crop. One-half of the oranges produced are processed - 
predominantly into juice. Orange juice concentrate is the main citrus 
commodity traded internationally.
Tariffs on citrus juices are the major form of assistance 
benefiting citrus growing. Prior to 1977, imports of citrus juices, 
especially orange and tangerine juices, were subject to high specific 
rates of duty (and tariff quotas during 1976). In 1977 a 65 per cent 
ad valorem tariff was imposed on orange juice (one of the highest 
customs duties in the Australian Tariff Schedule). This was replaced 
by a variable tariff on orange and tangerine juices from 13 April 
1979. The 'threshold price' for purposes of determining the variable 
tariff, which operated over the remainder of the period, was S2.40 per 
kilogram of total soluble solids in orange and tangerine juices. The 
ad valorem equivalent of the variable tariff has been estimated as 
being approximately 70 per cent. The Fruit Industry Sugar Concession 
Committee (FTSCC) provides a concession on the price of sugar for 
fruit processors if those processors have paid prices determined by 
the FISCC on a)1 fruit purchased.
Most, fruit iuice products, including those made from citrus, are 
exempt from sales tax. The exemption applies to domestically produced 
juice products and no imports that are blended with locally produced
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juices in accordance with specified minimum local content 
requirements. This arrangement can thus provide assistance to the 
domestic fruit growing activitv.
Citrus growing also benefits from Commonwealth outlays generally 
available to the agricultural sector such as for research and 
extension, adjustment assistance and for fertiliser subsidies.
Al.6 Deciduous Canning Fruit Growing
Deciduous canning fruit growina includes apricots, peaches and 
pears used for canning. Estimated effective rates of assistance have 
fluctuated between a high of 26 per cent in 1975-76 to a low of 3 per 
cent in 1979-80.
Apart from the general assistance measures available to the 
agricultural sector, canning fruit growing has also benefited from 
commodity specific forms of assistance. These forms of assistance 
include tariffs, a home consumption price scheme and government loans 
to canneries.
From 1 January 1980, the Australian Canned Fruits Corporation 
(ACFC) was established and empowered to acquire and sell Australian 
canned fruits production. The ACFC is responsible for determining 
prices, terms and conditions for sales in domestic and export markets. 
Returns from the various markets are equalised. Prior to the 
establishment of the compulsorv scheme, certain voluntary schemes 
operated with exemption from the provisions of the Trade Practices 
Act. Not all canneries participated in these voluntary schemes and, 
consequently, enforcement of discriminatory domestic pricing was 
sometimes ineffective.
A1.7 Sugar Cane Growing
Sugar cane growing has received negative effective rates of
assistance in all vears since 1973-74.
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Domestic marketing arrangements operate for the sugar industry 
which result in administered prices being set for refined sugar 
products. This home consumption pricing scheme is facilitated by an 
embargo on the import of sugar and sugar products under the Sugar 
Agreements between the Commonwealth and Queensland Governments. 
Consequently, the domestic market is reserved entirely for sugar 
produced in Australia.
Under the various Sugar Agreements, the sugar industry provides a 
rebate (currently $15 per tonne) to fruit processors using sugar in 
the manufacture of certain fruit products. In order to qualify for 
the rebate, fruit processors must comply with certain prescribed 
conditions, including that they pay not less than specified minimum 
prices for fresh fruit. These minimum prices are determined by the 
Fruit Industry Sugar Concession Committee (FISCC) which administers 
the domestic rebate.
The Sugar Agreement also makes provision for the establishment of 
the Export Sugar Committee (ESC) to administer the payment of a rebate 
to exporters of products containing sugar. The aim of the scheme is 
to reduce the cost of sugar to these exporters to a level comparable 
with prevailing world sugar prices when the administered home 
consumption price is higher.
The sugar industry also receives assistance from measures which 
are generally available to the agricultural sector. These include 
subsidies on fertilisers, income tax concessions and, to a lesser 
extent, rural adjustment finance and access to facilities supplving 
concessional credit.
Farmers in Queensland, the main producing State, face a number of 
constraints which control the growing of sugar cane. The main ones 
are that:
. sugar additional to the amount The Sugar Board has agreed to 
accept for marketing, or has been manufactured from sugar cane 
grown on land which has not been assigned for cane growing, is 
paid for at a ponaltv rate of $1 per tnnne;
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. market (de]ivery) quotas operate for individual farms and for 
each sugar mill;
market (delivery) quotas for farmers can be sold or transferred 
separately from the assigned land but only subject to the 
approval of the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board; and
the grower can only deliver his cane to the mill to which his 
land is assigned and at times and delivery points provided for in 
the award established by the Local Sugar Cane Prices Board. 
Variations in this award have occasionally occurred but only with 
the approval of the Local Board.
A1.8 Fisheries and Fish Processing
Government assistance for the catching and processing of fish, 
crustaceans and molluscs has been provided through expenditure on 
research and exploration, expenditure on export inspection services, 
tariffs and other restraints on imports. The industry has also been 
assisted by general measures such as investment allowances, some sales 
tax exemptions and taxation concessions generally available to primary 
producers.
A1.9 Wood-Based Panel Products
TAC (1981b) provides details of assistance to this industry. 
Imports from general sources of particleboard and hardboard are 
dutiable at 30 per cent, plywood at 40 per cent and most other 
panelboards at 15 per cent. Veneers are dutiable at 15 per cent. 
Imports of particleboard and hardboard from Papua New Guinea are 
dutiable at 30 per cent with most other products duty free. A 15 per 
cent margin of preference is afforded most imports of New Zealand 
origin, the most significant exception being plywood which enters 
free.
Three quota arrangements applv to plywood. A tariff quota was 
imposed on imports of thick plywood from 1 July 1976 and expired on 30 
June 1982. Imports within the annual quota of 10 000 cubic metres are
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dutiable at 40 per cent (General). Over-quota imports from General 
rate source? are dutiable at 40 per cent plus $0.35 per square metre 
for each ran, or part thereof of thickness in eycess of 5.5 mm. 
Different rates applv to imports from Papua New Guinea or Canada.
Imports of plywood from New Zealand are duty free and not subject 
to any quota restrictions.
Imports of up to 7135 cubic metres annually of 'hiqh moisture 
resistant' plywood from Papua New Guinea have been permitted duty free 
entry since 1957.
A third quota was established recently under the South Pacific 
Pegional Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement. Australia has 
undertaken to permit duty free entrv from Fiii of 2000 cubic metres of 
olywood each year.
Al.10 Fertiliser Pounties/Subsidies
Subsidies for the consumption of phosphatic and nitrogenous 
fertilisers were first introduced in the 1930s. The current 
assistance arrangements for phosphatic fertilisers have (with the 
exception of 1975) operated continuously since 1963 under the 
Phosphate Fertilizers Bounty Act and for nitrocienous fertilisers since 
1966 under the Nitrogenous Fertilizers Subsidy Act.
Under these Acts, payments are made to Australian manufacturers 
of eligible fertilisers. The Acts reauire manufacturers of e1igible
ferti11sers to pass on the subsidy to users bv charging "lower
fertiliser prices. Tn 1980-■81 the bounty rate for phosphatic
fertilisers was $1 2 per tonne and the subsidy rate for nitrogenous
fertilisers was $20 per tonne.
Al.ll Rural Adjustment
The adjustment schemes introduced in the early seventies were 
reviewed bv the TAC in 197S. Subsequently, the Commonwealth 
Government introduced a sinqle scheme, known as the PAS, to provide 
adjustment assistance to all agricultural activit ies.
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As stated in the general principles to the P7\S '...the 
over-riding objective is to help restore to viability those farns and 
farmers with the capacity to maintain viability once achieved'. The 
maioritv of farms (over 90 per cent) in Australia are operated as 
family businesses. It has been recognised that, in providing 
assistance, close interrelationships exist between the viability of 
the farm as a business and the welfare, of the farm as a household. 
Almost without exception, the reconstruction/adjustment schemes have 
sought to confine the benefits of assistance to existing farmers 
experiencing financial difficulties. Farmers not in need, or with 
suitable commercial finance available, new entrants, and part-time and 
corporate farmers have been ineligible.
The main types of assistance included in RAS are:
. Debt reconstruction has been designed to assist farmers in
financial difficulties and likelv to be forced to sell their 
property or farm assets to meet their commitments, but who, with 
assistance, have reasonable prospects of long term commercial 
viability. The assistance is by way of long term concessional 
loans that enable them to reschedule established debt repayments.
Carrv-on loans are essentially for similar purposes. However, 
they are only available for limited periods to farmers in a 
specified activity agreed, from time to time, between 
Commonwealth and State Governments to be suffering a severe 
market downturn or similar situation.
. Farm build-up assistance, as the name implies, allows some
farmers to increase the size of their properties. It is to 
encourage the amalgamation of small non-viable properties, or the 
purchase of additional land by a farmer whose property has become 
too small to remain viable. The assistance is by way of lonq 
term concessional loans.
Farm development assistance provides lonq term concessional loans 
to finance improvements of a property where eommercial finance is 
unavailable and where there are prospects of restoring long term 
commercial viability.
Rehabilitation assistance is a form of welfare assistance which
applies to farmers who have been refused debt reconstruction
assistance on the grounds that their farms lack adequate
prospects of long term viability. It also applies to farmers who 
have had their properties purchased under the provisions of farm 
build-up assistance and who leave farming under conditions of
financial hardship. It provides loans, convertible to grants, to 
those leaving their farms.
Household support is an additional welfare support measure that 
was introduced with the RAS. It provides qrant.s, and loans 
convertible to grants, to aive farmers who were judged to be 
operating non-viable farms and therefore suffering personal and 
family hardship, a 'breathing space' in which to assess their 
long term options. It is designed to bring the net household
income of a farmer to the level he would have if he had been 
eligible under the current unemployment benefit scheme.
